

**BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

AIR FORCE MANUAL 11-2C-17V2

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Flying Operations

**C-17 AIRCREW EVALUATION
CRITERIA**



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This manual implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 11-2, *Aircrew Operations*. It establishes evaluation criteria for the operation of C-17 aircraft to safely and successfully accomplish their worldwide mobility missions. This is a specialized publication intended for use by Airmen who have graduated from technical training related to this publication. It is used in conjunction with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-202V2, *Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Program*, and the appropriate major command (MAJCOM) supplement. This manual is applicable to the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. This publication does not apply to the United States Space Force. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements must be routed to the OPR of this publication for coordination prior to certification and approval. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See Department of the Air Force Instruction (DAFI) 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the requestor’s commander for non-tiered compliance

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document is substantially revised and needs to be completely reviewed. Major changes made encompass the Stan/Eval Program, Instructor and Pilot Airdrop evaluation requirements, use of AF Form 3862, *Aircrew Evaluation Worksheet*, and Pilot Senior Officer documentation.

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Chapter 1

GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1. General. This manual provides flight examiners and aircrews with procedures and evaluation criteria/tolerances to be used during flight evaluations as specified in AFI 11-202V2. Specific areas for evaluation are prescribed to ensure an accurate assessment of the proficiency and capabilities of aircrews. Evaluators use this AFMAN when conducting aircrew evaluations. Instructors use this AFMAN when preparing aircrews for qualification.

1.2. Key Words Explained.

1.2.1. “Will,” “shall,” and “must” indicate a mandatory requirement.

1.2.2. “Should” is normally used to indicate a preferred, but not mandatory, method of accomplishment.

1.2.3. “May” indicates an acceptable or suggested means of accomplishment.

1.2.4. “Note” indicates operating procedures, techniques, etc., that are considered essential to emphasize.

1.3. Evaluations. This manual establishes standardized instrument, qualification, mission, and instructor evaluation criteria. It also establishes each grading item, referred to as areas/subareas, necessary for the successful completion of evaluations and identifies required areas/subareas that are considered critical or non-critical.

1.4. Roles and Responsibilities.

1.4.1. MAJCOM Director of Operations (MAJCOM/A3). AMC is designated lead command for the C-17 Mission Design Series (MDS) aircraft and is responsible for establishing and standardizing aircrew evaluations in coordination with user commands. **(T-2).**

1.4.2. Group Commander (OG/CC) or equivalent. OG/CCs are responsible for establishing and maintaining the Standardization and Evaluation program and ensure evaluators administer evaluations in accordance with AFI 11-202V2, appropriate MAJCOM supplement, and this publication. **(T-2).**

1.4.3. Squadron Commander (SQ/CC) or designated representative. SQ/CCs are responsible for establishing and maintaining the Squadron Standardization and Evaluation program and ensure evaluators administer evaluations in accordance with AFI 11-202V2, appropriate MAJCOM supplement, and this publication. **(T-2).**

1.4.4. Flight Examiners. Flight Examiners are responsible for administering evaluations in accordance with AFI 11-202V2, appropriate MAJCOM supplement, and this publication. **(T-2).**

1.5. Evaluation Requirements. Accomplish evaluations concurrently, whenever practical. Examiners and examinees will be current and qualified in all areas/subareas that are required for that particular evaluation. **(T-3).** This does not apply to requalification evaluations. The required areas are those annotated with “R” or “V” on the AF Form 3862. See [paragraph 1.10](#) for use of the AF Form 3862. Each C-17 crew member will be evaluated at the frequency in AFI 11-202V2 and the appropriate MAJCOM supplement. **(T-2).**

1.5.1. Qualification (QUAL) Evaluation. All C-17 aircrew members will successfully complete initial and periodic qualification evaluations including the requisite open-book, closed-book, and boldface written examinations, Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE), and an Aircrew Training Device (ATD) or flight evaluation. **(T-2).**

1.5.2. Instrument (INSTM) Evaluation. All C-17 pilots will successfully complete initial and periodic instrument evaluations including the open-book Instrument Examination in accordance with AFMAN 11-210, *Instrument Refresher Program (IRP)*, and an ATD or flight evaluation. **(T-2).** Additionally, pilots will be current for the Instrument Refresher Course (IRC) when being administered the instrument evaluation. **(T-2).**

1.5.3. Mission (MSN) Evaluations. C-17 aircrew members will successfully complete initial and periodic mission evaluations. **(T-1).** **Exception:** Crew members only required to maintain Basic Aircraft Qualification (BAQ) and those designated as Flying Training Level (FTL) E are not required to complete mission evaluations. Mission evaluations should be as realistic as possible with a minimum of simulated events.

1.5.4. Instructor (INSTR) Evaluations. To initially qualify as an instructor in the C-17, aircrew members will successfully complete an initial instructor qualification course and evaluation. **(T-1).** Subsequently, aircrew members designated as instructors will be evaluated on their ability to instruct during all periodic evaluations. **(T-1).**

1.5.5. SPOT Evaluations. See AFI 11-202V2 for specific SPOT evaluation purposes and options available to convert a SPOT evaluation to meet requirements of a periodic evaluation. Requalification Spot (RQ SPOT) Evaluations will only be used for specific outlined areas in **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 3** below. **(T-2).**

1.5.6. Emergency Procedures Evaluations (EPE). EPEs will be administered in accordance with AFI 11-202V2 requirements and will evaluate an aircrew member's knowledge of emergency procedures and systems knowledge. **(T-2).** At a minimum, an EPE evaluating rejected takeoff procedures and takeoff go/no-go decision making should be incorporated. EPEs will be administered for all qualification and mission evaluations and may be accomplished verbally, in flight, or in an ATD. **(T-2).**

1.5.6.1. The EPE will include areas commensurate with the examinee's graduated training (e.g., initial, non-instructor, instructor, etc.) or as specified in AFI 11-202V2 and MAJCOM supplement. **(T-2).**

1.5.6.2. Examinees may use publications that are normally available in flight. The examinee must be able to recite all boldface items from memory. **(T-2).**

1.5.6.3. Examinees receiving an overall EPE grade of unqualified will be placed in supervised status until recommended additional training and re-evaluation are completed. **(T-1).** Examinees receiving an overall EPE grade of unqualified because of unsatisfactory boldface procedures will not be permitted to fly in their aircrew position until a successful re-evaluation is accomplished. **(T-1).** Accomplish additional training according to requirements in AFI 11-202V2.

1.5.7. Evaluation Prefixes. Use AFI 11-202V2 evaluation prefixes for AF Form 8, *Certificate of Aircrew Qualification*. Use "MSN" for the pilot airland evaluation, and "QUAL/MSN" for the loadmaster airland evaluation. Identify unique mission type evaluation descriptions in

parenthesis (e.g., MSN (AD), MSN (SOLL II), MSN (PNAF)). For combined pilot airland and airdrop mission evaluations annotate areas in parenthesis (e.g., MSN (AD), MSN (AL-AD-SOLLII LS)). For combined loadmaster airland and airdrop evaluations annotate in parenthesis (e.g., QUAL/MSN (AD)). Use the same annotation on the AF Form 942, *Record of Evaluation*.

1.5.8. Conduct a thorough pre-mission briefing and post-mission debriefing with the examinee and applicable aircrew members on all aspects of the evaluation. At a minimum, on all evaluations where the examinee is downgraded in Crew Resource Management (CRM)/Threat Error Management (TEM), evaluators will use the AMC Form 4031, *CRM/TEM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation*, or other MAJCOM approved assessment form(s) to critically document and evaluate CRM/TEM skills. This form will be used in feedback during evaluation debriefs and forwarded to AMC Training (AMC/A3T) for CRM trend analysis in accordance with AFI 11-290, *Cockpit/Crew Resource Management Program*, or input into <https://mafops.us.af.mil>. (T-2).

1.6. Grading Policies.

1.6.1. The overall qualification level awarded an evaluation is based on performance during both the flight and ground phases.

1.6.2. Use the grading criteria (see [Chapter 2](#) and [Chapter 3](#)) in this manual to grade areas/subareas accomplished during an evaluation. (T-1). The flight examiner must grade the areas/subareas listed as “required” in the GENERAL and specific evaluation sections of this manual. (T-1). Any areas/subareas observed but not “required” will be graded in accordance with the criteria in this manual. (T-1). Reference [paragraph 1.10.1](#) for definitions of required areas/subareas.

1.6.3. For evaluations accomplished in the aircraft, flight examiners will make every effort to evaluate all required areas/subareas in the aircraft. (T-1). When evaluation of a required area/subarea is not possible in the aircraft, the area/subarea can be evaluated in an ATD (if allowed in this manual).

1.7. Grading System.

1.7.1. Qualification Levels. Qualification levels are assigned both to individual evaluations (e.g., flight evals and EPEs) as well as overall performance. Individual evaluations are graded as a compilation of all area/subarea grades. Overall performance is graded as a compilation of all requisite tasks associated with the required evaluation. Qualification levels (Q1, Q2, & Q3) will be assigned in accordance with AFI 11-202V2. (T-1).

1.7.2. Area/Subarea Grades. Areas/subareas have a two-level (Q/U) or three-level (Q/Q-/U) grading system. Discrepancies will be documented against the established area/subareas. (T-1). The overall area grade is the lowest of any subarea grade awarded. Q, Q-, and U grading criteria will be in accordance with AFI 11-202V2. (T-1).

1.7.3. The flight examiner will indicate all appropriate restriction(s) and additional training on the AF Form 8. (T-1).

1.7.4. Critical Areas. Critical areas require adequate accomplishment by the aircrew member in order to successfully achieve the mission objectives. Assign a qualification level of “Q3” for unsatisfactory performance in any critical area/subarea or if the flight examiner assumes

the examinee's duties. Critical areas are identified in the grading criteria tables in this manual where the "Q-" block on the AF Form 3862 is blacked out.

1.7.5. Requisite Areas. Requisite areas require adequate accomplishment by the aircrew member in order to satisfy evaluation criteria. Place the member in supervised status and document failure of the requisite in accordance with AFI11-202V2.

1.8. Unsatisfactory Performance.

1.8.1. Immediately correct breaches of flying safety or flight discipline by any aircrew member (including one in a different crew position). When an examinee jeopardizes safety of flight, the evaluator may assume the duties of that aircrew member (if qualified in that position). This does not mean the flight examiner assumes the examinee's position any time unsatisfactory performance is observed.

1.8.2. When a flight examiner observes less than qualification level "Q1" performance from any crew member not being evaluated, the flight examiner will consult with appropriate qualified personnel and the Operations Group Standardization and Evaluation (OGV) Chief to complete a follow-on recommendation for appropriate action to the unit commander (e.g., commander-directed downgrade, follow-on No Notice (N/N) evaluation, additional training, etc.). **(T-1)**. The unit commander will determine the final course-of-action in accordance with "commander-directed downgrade" procedures. **(T-1)**.

1.8.3. Immediately notify the examinee's squadron commander/operations officer or next available level of supervision when less than Q1 performance is observed.

1.8.4. Unsatisfactory performance in a non-critical area/subarea results in no higher than a qualification level "Q2."

1.8.5. In the event of unsatisfactory performance, the flight examiner, in conjunction with the unit commander, will determine additional training requirements. **(T-2)**. Additional training should not be accomplished on the same flight. **Exception:** Additional training on the same flight is allowed when unique situations presenting valuable training opportunities exist (e.g., thunderstorm avoidance, crosswind landings). This option requires utmost flight examiner discretion and judicious application. When used, the flight examiner must inform the examinee when the additional training begins and ends.

1.8.6. The ATD may be used to accomplish additional training and re-checks. Areas for additional training and re-checks should be limited to those areas/subareas that can be realistically accomplished in the ATD.

1.8.7. Requalification evaluations due to unsatisfactory performance should be administered by a flight examiner other than the one who administered the original evaluation.

1.9. Conduct of Evaluations.

1.9.1. Flight examiners will pre-brief the examinee on the conduct, purpose, requirements of the evaluation, and all applicable evaluation criteria. **(T-2)**. Flight examiners will then evaluate the examinee in each required graded area/subarea. **(T-1)**. Flight examiners should not evaluate personnel they have primarily trained or have recommended for upgrade evaluation.

1.9.2. Unless otherwise specified, flight examiners may conduct the evaluation in any crew position/seat which best enables the flight examiner to observe the examinee's performance.

1.9.3. Note discrepancies and deviations from prescribed tolerances and performance criteria during the evaluation. Compare the examinee's performance with the tolerances provided in the grading criteria and assign an appropriate grade for each area/subarea.

1.9.3.1. An evaluation cannot be changed to a training mission to avoid documenting substandard performance, nor can a training mission be changed to an evaluation.

1.9.3.2. The judgment of the flight examiner, guidance provided in AFI 11-202V2, C-17 Aircrew Training System (ATS) courseware, and this publication are the determining factors in assigning an overall grade. The flight examiner should thoroughly critique all aspects of the flight. During the critique, the flight examiner reviews the examinee's overall rating, specific deviations, area/subarea grades assigned, and any additional training required.

1.9.4. Flight examiners who do not maintain Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) currency will not fly on mission legs carrying nuclear cargo unless they obtain Mission Essential Personnel (MEP) approval in accordance with AFMAN 13-526, *Nuclear Airlift Operations*. **(T-3)**. Flight examiners (not nuclear qualified) may give a SPOT or N/N evaluation on a depositioning leg provided no nuclear cargo is carried and they meet security clearance requirements of the mission. **(T-1)**.

1.10. Use of AF Form 3862, *Aircrew Evaluation Worksheet*. Units will use the AMC Standardization and Evaluation (AMC/A3V) created AF Form 3862. **(T-2)**. Units may create overprints of the AF Form 3862, however, they are not authorized to change (i.e., add, delete or alter in any way) the areas/subareas. **(T-2)**. These worksheets are located on the Aircrew Publications SharePoint® site. Reference the worksheet during the evaluation to ensure all required areas/subareas are evaluated. Prior to each evaluation, evaluators must ensure they have the most current version of the applicable AF Form 3862 for the evaluation being administered. **(T-2)**. Record positive and negative trend information and aircrew member's performance. File an examiner signed AF Form 3862 or an examiner signed draft copy of the AF Form 8 in the aircrew member's Flight Evaluation Folder (FEF) immediately after the flight evaluation as a temporary record of the evaluation results. Maintain until the finished AF Form 8 is added to the FEF and then discard.

1.10.1. Required Areas. The AF Forms 3862 used in conjunction with this AFMAN denote the areas/subareas that are required on evaluations. In addition to evaluation definitions in **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 3** below, the AF Form 3862s are directive in nature as to which areas/subareas are to be graded. Letters on the AF Form 3862 denote which events are required.

1.10.1.1. "R" denotes a required area/subarea that will be observed during the evaluation.

1.10.1.2. "V" denotes a required area/subarea that may be evaluated verbally rather than observed.

1.10.1.3. No letter next to the area/subarea denotes an area/subarea that is not required to be evaluated unless observed.

1.10.1.4. If an area defined as either “R” or “V” has associated subareas that are not defined by an “R” or a “V” at least one of those subareas must be performed to complete the event. As an example: For a MSN evaluation for pilots, **Area 37**, Ground Operations, is defined as “R.” During the evaluation at least one of the **subareas (37A, 37B, and/or 37C)** must be evaluated.

1.10.2. Re-qualification, initial, upgrade, etc., evaluations should use the AF Form 3862 associated with the qualification the examinee is being evaluated to. As examples: For an Instructor RQ mission evaluation, use the AF Form 3862 for an instructor mission. For a student in upgrade to MP in the Pilot Check Out (PCO) course, use the MP mission AF Form 3862.

1.11. Aircrew Testing. See testing requirements in AFI 11-202V2 and include the following:

1.11.1. Formal Training Unit (FTU) Formal School Courses (Initial or Requalification): Complete an end of course (EOC) exam and boldface administered by the ATS contractor (computer based training (CBT) may be used). Document EOC exam for AF Form 8 as “Open/Closed-book/EOC,” date completed, and the appropriate score.

1.11.2. For recurring evaluations, C-17 ATS phase training CBTs satisfy open-book exam requisite. CBT questions should be treated as a secure question bank (SQB) using the guidance in AFI 11-202V2. Document on AF Form 8 as “Open-book/ATS,” Date: enter date last phase CBT was completed (within eligibility period) and Grade: “Comp.” A supplemental open-book exam may be developed at the unit level to supplement the ATS exams to include the latest local procedures, tactics, and MAJCOM/unit policy change. Specify supplemental open-book testing (including documentation on AF Form 8) requirements in the appropriate MAJCOM supplement (i.e., PNAF & SOLL II). **Exception:** Senior officer qualified (SOQ) may satisfy the open-book exam requisite by completing the phase CBTs for the quarter in which the evaluation will occur or by completing a unit produced open-book exam that covers local procedures, tactics, and MAJCOM/unit policy change.

1.11.3. Closed Book Exam. A closed book exam is a requisite for the periodic qualification (QUAL) evaluation. Closed book questions come from C-17 specific and local procedure master question files (MQF). These questions emphasize information and system knowledge necessary for safe flight and mission accomplishment. The basic exam will consist of no less than 20 questions. **(T-1).** Additional questions commensurate with the crew member’s level of qualification and/or special mission qualifications (airdrop, SOLL II, PNAF, etc.) are included in the closed book exam. See **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 3** for additional testing requirements. HQ AMC/A3V manages the C-17 MQF.

1.11.4. Instrument Exam. The instrument written exam is accomplished during the 6-month QUAL/INSTM eligibility period. The C-17 Instrument Exam CBT satisfies written requirements of the instrument exam (NOTE: this is not the ADLS IRC CBT). Document the exam completion on AF Form 8 as INSTRUMENT, date completed, and the appropriate score.

1.12. Typical C-17 Evaluation Profile(s). The unit will determine the evaluation profile(s) suitable for inflight evaluations with unit OG/OGV approval (approval of the unit’s flying schedule satisfies this requirement). **(T-3).** See **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 3** for specific aircrew requirements regarding SOLL II, PNAF, and airdrop evaluations.

Chapter 2

PILOT EVALUATIONS

2.1. General. This chapter standardizes initial, periodic, and requalification evaluations, including requirements for instrument, qualification, mission, and instructor evaluations. The C-17 pilot evaluation process allows commanders maximum flexibility. Certified evaluators will be evaluated to an instructor level. The process is normally divided into two evaluations: QUAL/INSTM qualifies the pilot in the basic operation of the C-17 and MSN adds the appropriate mission areas as a minimum for airland qualification. Additional mission evaluation areas (e.g., En Route (OME only), SOLL II, or PNAF) are added with unit commander approval. Qualification/mission and additional mission qualifications require an expiration date of qualification in accordance with AFI 11-202V2. Instructor qualification does not have an expiration date of qualification. Evaluators may conduct evaluations when scheduled as primary aircrew members. Evaluators may regain currency during the evaluation if done prior to the evaluation of that area/subarea.

2.2. Instrument Evaluations (Initial, Periodic, and Requalification). The C-17 Instrument Evaluation should be conducted in the Weapons System Trainer (WST) in conjunction with the qualification evaluation. Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas. A minimum of three instrument approaches will be evaluated, with a minimum of one precision and one non-precision. **Exception:** Pilot Senior Officer instrument evaluations will be completed in the aircraft and include a minimum of one instrument approach (precision or non-precision). (T-2).

2.3. Qualification Evaluation (Initial, Periodic, and Requalification). The C-17 qualification evaluation should be conducted in the WST in conjunction with the instrument evaluation. Combine periodic QUAL/INSTM in the WST on a single AF Form 8 according to AFI 11-202V2. Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas/subareas. **NOTE:** Evaluate First Pilots (FPs) on at least one landing in both left and right seats. Non-certified ACs (FPLs) will be treated as MPs for purposes of the qualification evaluation.

2.4. Mission Evaluation (Initial, Periodic, and Requalification). Include all areas under GENERAL and all other applicable areas as annotated on applicable AF Form 3862. If accomplished at night, approaches and landings should be conducted while using Night Vision Goggles (NVGs).

2.4.1. Pilot (FP) (Airland-Qualified). On initial qualification, FPs will be evaluated from the right seat. On recurring evaluations, FPs may be evaluated from either seat. Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas/subareas. Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties will be evaluated to an Assault Landing Zone (ALZ) marked in accordance with DAFMAN 13-217, *Drop Zone, Landing Zone, and Helicopter Landing Zone Operations*. (T-2).

2.4.2. Aircraft Commander (AC) (Airland-Qualified). ACs will be evaluated from the left seat (either seat for instructor). (T-2). Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas/subareas. A tactical approach will be flown to a full flap landing on an ALZ. (T-2). **Note:** ALZ Size Requirements. The maximum size of the runway for the ALZ operations during the evaluation will be 5000 feet by 100 feet, and marked in accordance with DAFMAN 13-217. At night, evaluations are authorized to a lighted landing zone no larger

than 5000 feet by 100 feet, and a touchdown zone no longer than 500 feet. **Exception:** The OG/CC may approve, on a case-by-case basis, ALZ landings during the day to larger runways for recurring mission evaluations. The runway will be clearly marked to identify the landing zone not larger than 5000 feet by 100 feet, and a touchdown zone no longer than 500 feet. Units will document on the AF Form 8 that the OG/CC approved the ALZ operations to said runway. ALZ operations on all initial and requalification mission evaluations will be to an ALZ not larger than 5000 feet by 100 feet.

2.4.3. Copilot (Airdrop-Qualified). Copilots will be evaluated from the right seat. **(T-2).** Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas. Evaluate the copilot's ability to complete aircraft checklists during en route, low-level, and airdrop segments. Evaluate the copilot's knowledge of airdrop procedures and ability to fly in a formation wing position. The evaluation will consist of at least one pass in Station Keeping Equipment (SKE)/Formation Flight System (FFS) and one pass in visual formation. **(T-2).** Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase "MSN (AD)".

2.4.4. Aircraft Commander (Airdrop-Qualified). ACs will be evaluated from the left seat (either seat for certified airdrop instructor or lead certified instructor). **(T-2).** Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase "MSN (AD)."

2.4.4.1. If conditions result in a no-drop, flight examiners may use their discretion to determine if the evaluation is complete.

2.4.4.2. A minimum of two aircraft are required to complete an airdrop-qualified mission evaluation.

2.4.4.3. Airdrop Method. The flight examiner may direct the crew to use a specific method, at his/her discretion.

2.4.4.4. A minimum of one SKE/FFS lead and one visual wing formation profile will be flown. An actual airdrop is desired, but not required.

2.4.5. INSTRUCTORS ONLY. Instructors may be evaluated, while instructing, as the Pilot Monitoring (PM) for the following required areas/subareas: 33, 36, 37. For all other required area/subareas the examinee must be the Pilot Flying (PF). **(T-2).**

2.4.6. Loss of currency that led to loss of qualification for takeoff and/or instrument approach and/or landing requires a requal evaluation in accordance with AFMAN 11-2C-17V1, *C-17 Aircrew Training*. Loss of currency that led to loss of qualification for Air to Air Refueling (AAR, RU01YM) and/or Assault Landings (ALZ, AL51YM) requires a requal SPOT evaluation in accordance with AFMAN 11-2C-17V1; annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as "RQ SPOT."

2.5. Additional Mission Evaluations.

2.5.1. Special Operations Low Level II (SOLL II, when MAJCOM-approved). Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas for initial, periodic or requalification evaluations. SOLL II qualification requires unit commander approval.

2.5.1.1. When evaluating a pilot for SOLL II qualification, annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase "MSN (SOLL II RS)," "MSN (SOLL II JS)" or "MSN (SOLL II LS)"

as appropriate. Add a SOLL II expiration date based on AFI 11-202V2. **NOTE:** C-17 qualification is based on the QUAL/INSTM and MSN evaluation expiration dates.

2.5.1.2. SOLL II (RS, JS, LS) evaluation profile includes:

2.5.1.2.1. Covert takeoff, Special Operations (SO) low-level, SO Personnel, SO Quick Drop Checklists, Pilot Directed Airdrop, Mission Computer Approach, AMP-4 Landing and Ground Operations. Gin Bear air refueling may be verbally evaluated. Verbally evaluate night vision goggles (NVG) limitations and SOLL II restrictions.

2.5.1.2.2. A minimum of two aircraft are required to complete a SOLL II MSN evaluation.

2.5.1.3. Left, Right, and Jump Seat pilots will receive an initial and periodic SOLL II evaluations. **(T-1).**

2.5.2. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Operations (when MAJCOM-approved). Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas for initial, periodic or requalification evaluations. PNAF qualification requires unit commander approval. Use the following:

2.5.2.1. PNAF evaluations will be conducted in accordance with AFMAN 13-526 and AFI 13-527, *Nuclear Weapons Airlift Operations Training*. **(T-1).** All aspects of the mission must simulate procedures outlined in AFMAN 13-526 for transport of nuclear cargo utilizing T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, *Loading and Air Transport of Nuclear Weapon Cargo (Nonpalletized)*. **(T-1).**

2.5.2.2. When completing the AF Form 8 for pilot PNAF qualification (initial or recurring) annotate "EPE" under ground phase and "MSN (PNAF Courier)" or "MSN (PNAF AC)" as appropriate under flight phase. Add a PNAF expiration date based on AFI 11-202V2. **NOTE:** C-17 qualification is based on the QUAL/INSTM and MSN evaluation expiration dates.

2.6. Instructor Evaluation. Flight examiners should place particular emphasis on the examinee's ability to recognize student difficulties and provide timely, effective corrective action. Demonstrate and/or instruct a variety of instrument/visual approaches (as applicable for the sortie), touch-and-go landings, air refueling procedures, ALZ landings, and ground operations.

2.6.1. Conduct initial (INIT) or requalification (RQ) instructor (INSTR) evaluations with a qualified pilot occupying the other seat. For INIT INSTR evaluations, the examinee will occupy the right seat. **(T-1).** For RQ INSTR the examinee may occupy either seat. Refer to applicable AF Form 3862 for required evaluation areas for initial, periodic, or requalification evaluations. All initial instructor evaluations conducted during formal training will be flown as a MSN evaluation, regardless of eligibility period. **(T-1).** Initial instructor evaluations combined with a MSN evaluation that result in a Q3 requires successful completion of the failed MSN evaluation before attempting another INIT INSTR evaluation.

2.6.2. Evaluate all areas under INSTRUCTOR in conjunction with periodic qualification/instrument and/or mission evaluations.

2.6.3. Unless otherwise noted, instructor pilots receiving periodic evaluations may be evaluated in either seat, but are not required to be evaluated in both.

2.7. Pilot Senior Officer. From the left seat, evaluate appropriate areas in GENERAL, QUALIFICATION, and INSTRUMENT (see applicable AF Form 3862). This evaluation will include at least two landings, a minimum of one instrument approach (precision or non-precision) and should consist of at least two VFR patterns. This evaluation will be completed in the aircraft. **(T-2).** Annotate AF Form 8 as a QUAL/INSTM evaluation with expiration date, crew position is "FP," and include a restriction in the comment section: "Fly only under direct supervision of a C-17 Instructor Pilot." Ground requisites for this evaluation are the EPE, instrument exam, closed book exam, open book exam, and boldface. The open book exam is accomplished via quarterly CBTs. See AFMAN 11-202V1, *Aircrew Training* and AFI 11-202V2 for additional information. A C-17 IP or above will be in the right seat. **(T-1).**

2.8. Operational Mission Evaluation (OME). All pilots will complete a one-time OME demonstrating their ability to operate in command of an aircraft performing the unit's primary mission prior to Aircraft Commander certification. **(T-1).** This evaluation is not required for pilots currently/previously certified to operate in command of C-17s. Document the OME on the AF Form 8 as a "SPOT" evaluation and include the following comment in the remarks section: "This OME was conducted in conjunction with Aircraft Commander certification." If this evaluation is intended to satisfy the requirements of a Mission Evaluation, comply with the requirements specified in AFI 11-202V2 and [paragraph 2.4](#) of this publication. Include the remark: "This evaluation was conducted in conjunction with Aircraft Commander Certification."

2.8.1. Although the goal is to complete the evaluation on the most representative mission, the profile must be balanced between mission availability and the imperative to not delay Aircraft Commander certification.

2.8.2. The evaluation profile is at the discretion of the OG/CC or equivalent, but will, at a minimum, include: Area 41 and all associated subareas; two mission legs (one will be an oceanic crossing); a takeoff, arrival, and landing; an off-station Remain Over Night (RON) and (if practical) tactical maneuvers. **(T-2).**

2.8.3. Members in units transitioning from one MDS to the C-17 must accomplish an OME in the C-17. **(T-2).**

2.9. Pilot Grading Criteria.

Table 2.1. General.

| | |
|--|---|
| Area 1, Directives and Publications. | |
| Q | Possessed a high level of knowledge of all applicable Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO publications/directives. Understood how to apply them to enhance mission accomplishment. Required publications (paper and electronic) were current and properly posted. |
| Q- | Unsure of some directives but could locate information in appropriate publications. Required publications (paper and electronic) were current but improperly posted. |
| U | Unaware of established directives and/or could not locate them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Required publications (paper or electronic) were not current. |
| Area 2, Mission Preparation/Planning/Performance. | |
| Q | Checked all factors applicable to flight such as weather, NOTAMs, alternate airfields, airfield suitability, fuel requirements, charts, etc. Displayed an appropriate level of |

knowledge of performance capabilities and operating data based on crew qualification. Evaluated performance data intended for use during takeoff/landing after final adjustments and corrections have been made.

Q- Made minor errors or omissions in checking all factors that could have detracted from mission effectiveness. Marginal knowledge of performance capabilities and/or operating data.

U Made major errors or omissions which would have prevented a safe or effective mission. Unsatisfactory knowledge of performance capabilities and/or operating data.

Area 3, Use of Checklists.

Q Consistently used and called for the correct checklist and briefing guide and gave the correct response/briefing at the appropriate time throughout the mission.

Q- Checklist responses were untimely and/or aircrew member required continual prompting for correct response. Briefing guides were not entirely accomplished (e.g.: skipping parts or improperly briefed).

U Used or called for incorrect checklist or consistently omitted checklist items. Unable to identify the correct checklist to use for a given situation. Untimely or incomplete checklist accomplishment. Briefing guides were omitted and/or not referenced.

Area 4, Safety Consciousness (Critical).

Q Aware of and complied with all factors required for safe aircraft operation and mission accomplishment.

U Not aware of or did not comply with all factors required for safe aircraft operation or mission accomplishment. Operated aircraft in a dangerous manner.

Area 5, Judgment/Compliance (Critical).

Q Prepared and completed mission in compliance with existing regulations and directives. Demonstrated knowledge of operating procedures and restrictions and where to find them in the correct publications.

U Unaware of established procedures and/or could not locate them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Failed to comply with a procedure that could have jeopardized safety or mission success.

Area 6, Crew Resource Management (CRM)/Threat and Error Management (TEM). in accordance with AFI 11-290, applicable MAJCOM supplements, and AMC Form 4031.

Q Proactively applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts throughout the flight/mission. Ensured safe/effective mission accomplishment by anticipating, recognizing, and mitigating relevant threats. Identified and mitigated own and other crew members' errors via the proper use of monitoring/crosschecking procedures and through the employment of applicable, established Verbalize, Verify, Monitor (VVM) practices/procedures.

Q- Reactively and inconsistently, or inadequately applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts but did not allow those deficiencies to detract from mission

accomplishment and/or flight safety. Unreliably and/or inadequately anticipated, identified, or mitigated relevant threats and/or own or other crew members' inconsequential errors.

U Did not apply appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts to ensure safe/effective mission accomplishment. Failed to anticipate, identify, or mitigate relevant threats and/or own or other crew members' consequential errors.

Sub-Area 6A, Automation Management.

Q Adhered to, and demonstrated appropriate knowledge of, published guidance regarding the operation of automated aircraft flight systems, PF/PM flight automation responsibilities, and VVM procedures as they relate to flight automation. Proficiently programmed, reviewed/verified, and operated automated flight systems at suitable levels to enhance situational awareness and/or to reduce pilot workload. Either did not make flight automation errors or quickly identified and mitigated those errors.

Q- Demonstrated limited knowledge of published guidance for the operation of automated flight systems, PF/PM flight automation responsibilities, and VVM procedures as they relate to flight automation. Inconsistently or inadequately programmed, reviewed/verified, or operated aircraft automated flight systems at suitable levels to enhance situational awareness and/or to reduce pilot workload. Inadequately reacted to the majority of flight automation errors/improperly identified and mitigated errors.

U Did not follow published guidance for the operation of automated flight systems, causing detriment to mission/flight accomplishment. Did not adequately employ PF, PM, and/or VVM guidance regarding the usage of flight automation systems or adequately program, review/verify and/or operate automated aircraft systems at suitable levels. Made, but did not identify or mitigate, consequential flight automation errors.

Area 7, Communication Procedures.

Q Complete knowledge of and compliance with correct communications procedures. Made concise radio and interphone transmissions with proper terminology. Complied with and demonstrated knowledge of all required instructions.

Q- Occasional deviations from procedures that required re-transmissions or resetting codes. Slow in initiating or missed several required radio calls. Transmissions contained extraneous information, were not in proper sequence or used non-standard terminology. Difficulty in configuring or operating HAVE QUICK, IFF, and/or secure voice equipment with little or no mission impact.

U Incorrect procedures or poor performance caused confusion and jeopardized mission accomplishment. Omitted numerous radio calls. Unable to configure or operate HAVE QUICK, IFF, and/or secure voice equipment with a direct impact on mission success.

Area 8, Life Support Systems/Egress.

Q Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Demonstrated and emphasized the proper procedures used to operate aircraft egress devices such as doors, windows, hatches, slides, rafts, escape ropes, etc.

Q- Limited knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Unsure of the proper operating procedures for some of the aircraft egress devices.

U Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Unable to properly operate aircraft egress devices.

Area 9, Knowledge/Completion of Forms.

Q All required forms and/or flight plans were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and in accordance with applicable Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO publications/directives. Related an accurate debrief of significant events to applicable agencies (e.g., intelligence, maintenance, etc.).

Q- Minor errors on forms and/or flight plans did not affect conduct of the mission. Incorrectly or incompletely reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or deviations.

U Did not accomplish required forms and/or flight plans. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant information due to major errors, omissions and/or deviations.

Area 10, Airmanship (Critical).

Q Executed the assigned mission in a timely, efficient manner. Demonstrated strict professional flight and crew discipline throughout all phases of flight. Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension.

U Decisions, or lack thereof, resulted in failure to accomplish the assigned mission. Failed to exhibit strict flight and crew discipline.

Area 11, Situational Awareness.

Q Maintained appropriate situational awareness throughout the flight. Was aware and correctly reacted to simulated or actual changes while in execution. Demonstrated utmost understanding of events in and around the flight.

Q- Minor lapses in situational awareness degraded accomplishment of a portion of the assigned mission. Misinterpreted events in and around the flight which may have negatively affected mission accomplishment.

U Major lack of situational awareness caused or would have caused failure of the assigned mission. Failed to recognize events in and around the flight that caused mission failure.

Area 12, Pilot Monitoring.

Q Effectively monitors aircraft configuration, energy state, performance, radios, and flight path. Supports PF by advising and intervening, as appropriate. Complies with applicable flight policies and procedures and makes required flight callouts (e.g., mandatory advisory calls, VVM, etc.). Remains vigilant to identify, communicate, and mitigate events/distractions that may adversely affect safe flight operations. Watchful of and communicates erroneous/conflicting aircraft instrumentation, incongruent control inputs, and inaccurate navigational information. Effectively addresses aircraft system failures and any unexpected aircraft flight guidance, performance, or configuration.

Q- Does not fully monitor aircraft configuration, energy state, performance, radios, or flight path. Slow to support PF by advising and intervening, as appropriate. Flight policies/procedures are not fully applied and required flight callouts (e.g., mandatory

advisory calls, VVM, etc.) are inconsistent. Vigilance in identifying, communicating, and mitigating events/distractions is sporadic but does not adversely affect flight safety. Inconsistencies in communicating erroneous/conflicting aircraft instrumentation, incongruent control inputs, or inaccurate navigational information. Intermittently addresses aircraft system failures and any unexpected aircraft flight guidance, performance, or configuration.

U Fails to support/advise the PF regarding aircraft configuration, energy state, performance, radios or flight path. Does not intervene, as appropriate. Application of flight policies/procedures is insufficient and required flight callouts (e.g., mandatory advisory calls, VVM, etc.) are not made. Vigilance in identifying, communicating, and mitigating events/distractions is inadequate and jeopardizes flight safety. Fails to address aircraft system failures and any unexpected aircraft flight guidance, performance, or configuration.

Table 2.2. Qualification.

| | |
|---|--|
| <p>General Tolerances. Use the following criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude, and heading/course:</p> | |
| Q | <p><i>Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS</i></p> <p><i>Altitude: +/-100 feet</i></p> <p><i>Heading/Course: +/-5 degrees</i></p> |
| Q- | <p>Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed:</p> <p><i>Altitude: +/-200 feet,</i></p> <p><i>Heading/Course: +/-10 degrees</i></p> |
| U | Exceeds Q- criteria. |
| <p>NOTE 1: Airspeed tolerances apply when a specific airspeed has been assigned by Air Traffic Control or prescribed in applicable directives. Airspeed “minus” tolerances are based on minimum maneuvering speed for aircraft configuration.</p> <p>NOTE 2: Add 50 feet (when practical) and 2 degrees to “all engines operating” criteria for “operations with an engine out” criteria.</p> | |
| <p>Area 13, Takeoff.</p> | |
| Q | Maintained smooth, positive aircraft control throughout the takeoff. Performed the takeoff in accordance with flight manual and as published/directed. |
| Q- | Minor deviations from published procedures without affecting safety of flight. Control was rough or erratic. Hesitant in application of procedures/corrections. |
| U | Takeoff was potentially dangerous. Exceeded aircraft/systems limitations. Failed to establish proper climb attitude. Excessive deviation from intended flight path. Violated flight manual procedures. Exceeded Q- criteria. |
| <p>Area 14, Engine Out Operations.</p> | |
| <p>NOTE: Use approach criteria for the type of approach being flown and the following:</p> | |

Q Proper control inputs were used to correct asymmetric condition. Aircraft was properly trimmed. Proper consideration was given to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the inoperative engine.

Q- Minor deviations in aircraft control allowed the aircraft to occasionally fly uncoordinated flight.

U Aircraft was not properly trimmed. Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the inoperative engine was potentially unsafe.

Area 15, Landings. Includes subareas 15A, $\frac{3}{4}$ Flap; 15B, Abnormal Configurations; 15C, Engine Out; and 15D, Touch and Go.

NOTE 1: Specific items to evaluate include aim point, threshold altitude, airspeed, sink rate, runway alignment, power push, power management, touchdown attitude, landing in a crab, and adherence to Stabilized Approach Criteria in accordance with AFMAN 11-2C-17V3, *C-17 Operations Procedures*.

NOTE 2: Landing airspeed tolerances apply to calculated approach speed.

NOTE 3: Add 5 KIAS to “all engines operating” criteria “fast” speed for operations with an engine out criteria. (i.e., Q criterion of +5/-0 KIAS becomes +10/-0 KIAS).

Q Performed landings as published/directed in accordance with flight manual and met the following criteria:

Airspeed: +5/-0 KIAS

Touchdown zone: 500-2,000 feet

Centerline: +/-15 feet left or right

Q- Performed landings with minor deviation to procedures as published/directed. Landed in a slight crab. Exceeded Q criteria but not the following:

Touchdown zone: Threshold-3,000 feet

Centerline: +/-25 feet left or right

U Landing not performed as published/directed. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Area 15E, Full Stop.

Q Performed as published/directed in accordance with flight manual. Braking action and reverse thrust actuation prompt and smooth. Maintained centerline during landing ground roll.

Q- Performed with minor deviation to procedures as published/directed. Braking action and reverse thrust actuation unnecessarily delayed or not smooth. Control was rough or erratic and/or slow to correct back to centerline.

U Not performed as published/directed. Braking or reverse thrust actuated prior to touchdown. Exceeded Q- criteria. Excessive deviations from centerline during landing ground roll and/or failed to correct back to centerline.

Area 16, All Engine Go Around.

Q Initiated and performed go-around promptly and in accordance with flight manual and directives. Applied smooth control inputs. Acquired and maintained a positive climb.

Q- Slow or hesitant to initiate go-around. Slightly over-controlled the aircraft. Minor deviations did not affect mission accomplishment or compromise safety.

U Did not initiate go-around when appropriate or directed. Major deviations or misapplication of procedures could have led to an unsafe condition.

Area 17, Engine Out Go Around/Engine Fail–Takeoff Continued.

Q Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction.

Q- Procedural errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth and positive. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction but some over/under control existed. Exceeded Q criteria.

U Rudder and/or aileron inputs were incorrect. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Area 18, Boldface Emergency Procedures (Critical). May be observed, verbalized or written (not required to be written exactly as in the T.O.).

Q Correct, immediate responses. Maintained aircraft control. Coordinated proper crew actions.

U Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory response or unsatisfactory performance of corrective actions.

Area 19, Other Emergency Procedures.

Q Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems. Performed/explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction. Effectively used available aircrew aids and checklists.

Q- Operated within prescribed limits but slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions. Did not effectively use checklists and/or experienced delays, omissions or deviations in use of checklist and/or available aids.

U Attempted to exceed limitations. Unable or failed to analyze problem or take proper corrective action. Did not use checklists or available aids effectively.

Area 20, Systems Operations/Knowledge/Limitations.

Q Demonstrated/explained a complete knowledge of aircraft systems operations, aircraft automation (e.g., AFCS & Mission Computer (MC)) and their limitations. Showed the proper procedural use of aircraft systems and automation.

Q- Marginal knowledge of aircraft systems operations, aircraft automation (e.g., AFCS & MC) and their limitations. Used individual technique instead of established procedure and was unaware of differences.

U Unsatisfactory systems and automation knowledge. Unable to demonstrate/explain the procedures for aircraft system operations, aircraft automation (e.g., AFCS & MC) and their limitations.

Table 2.3. Instrument.

General Tolerances. Use the following criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, level-off altitude and heading/course with all engines operating:

Q *Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS*

Level-off Altitude: +/-100 feet

Heading/Course: +/-5 degrees

Q- Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed:

Level-off Altitude: +/-200 feet

Heading/Course: +/-10 degrees of controller's instructions Precision

Approach Radar (PAR)

Glide Slope: Within one dot low, two dots high (ILS/MLS)

Azimuth: Within two dots (ILS/MLS)

U Exceeds Q- criteria.

NOTE 1: Airspeed tolerances apply when a specific airspeed has been assigned by Air Traffic Control or prescribed in applicable directives. Airspeed "minus" tolerances is based on minimum maneuvering speed for aircraft configuration.

NOTE 2: Add 5 KIAS to all engines operating criteria "fast" speed, 50 feet (when practical) and 2 degrees to all engines operating criteria for operations with an engine out criteria.

Area 21, Instrument Departure.

Q Complied with all restrictions or controlling agency instructions. Made all required reports. Applied course/heading corrections promptly. Demonstrated smooth, positive control.

Q- Minor deviations in navigation occurred during departure. Slow to comply with controlling agency instructions or unsure of reporting requirements. Slow to apply course/heading corrections. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth and positive.

U Failed to comply with published/directed departure or controlling agency instructions. Accepted an inaccurate clearance. Aircraft control was erratic.

Area 22, En Route Navigation.

Q Satisfactory capability to navigate using all available means. Used appropriate navigation procedures. Complied with clearance instructions. Aware of position at all times.

Q- Minor errors in procedures/use of navigation equipment. Slow to comply with clearance instructions. Had some difficulty in establishing exact position and course. Slow to adjust for deviations in time and course.

U Major errors in procedures/use of navigation equipment. Could not establish position. Failed to recognize checkpoints or adjust for deviation in time and course. Exceeded Q-criteria.

Area 23, Holding.

Q Performed entry and holding in accordance with published procedures and directives.

Timing: +/-15 seconds

DME: +/-2 DME

Azimuth: Within two dots (ILS/MLS)

Q- Performed entry and holding procedures with minor deviations. Exceed Q criteria but within instrument tolerances.

Timing: +/-20 seconds

DME: +/-3 DME

U Holding not in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Area 24, Use of NAVAIDs.

Q Ensured NAVAIDs were properly tuned, identified and monitored.

Q- Some deviations in tuning, identifying and monitoring NAVAIDs.

U Did not ensure NAVAIDs were tuned, identified and monitored.

Area 25, Descent/Arrival.

Q Performed descent as directed. Complied with all flight manual, controller-issued or STAR restrictions in a proficient manner. Accomplished all required checks.

Q- Performed descent as directed with minor deviations that did not compromise mission safety. Slow to accomplish required checks.

U Performed descent with major deviations. Did not accomplish required checks. Erratic corrections. Exceeded flight manual limitations.

Area 26, Precision Approach. Use the following criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude, heading, glide slope and azimuth and adhere to Stabilized Approach Criteria in accordance with AFMAN 11-2C-17V3:

Q *Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS*

Altitude: Initiated missed approach at decision altitude +50/-0 feet

Heading: +/-5 degrees of controller's instructions (PAR)

Glide Slope: Within one dot (ILS/MLS)

Azimuth: Within one dot (ILS/MLS)

WHEN AUTHORIZED, RNAV only: Verified RAIM and RNAV mission computer data vs Instrument Approach Plate (IAP) (leg lengths, headings and altitudes).

Q- Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed:

Altitude: Initiated missed approach at decision altitude +100/-0 feet

Heading: +/-10 degrees of controller's instructions (PAR)

Glide Slope: Within one dot low, two dots high (ILS/MLS)

Azimuth: Within two dots (ILS/MLS)

U Exceeded Q- criteria. WHEN AUTHORIZED, RNAV only: Failed to verify RAIM and RNAV mission computer data vs IAP (leg lengths, headings and altitudes are accurate and within tolerances).

NOTE 1: Airspeed tolerances are based on computed approach speed.

NOTE 2: Add 5 KIAS to all engines operating criteria "fast" speed, 50 feet (when practical) and 2 degrees to all engines operating criteria for operations with an engine out criteria.

Subarea 26A, PAR.

Q Approach was in accordance with published procedures. Smooth and timely response to controller's instructions. Established initial glide path and maintained with only minor deviations. Complied with decision altitude. Position would have permitted a safe landing. Elevation did not consistently exceed slightly above or slightly below glide path.

Q- Performed approach with minor deviations. Slow to respond to controller's instructions and make corrections. Improper glide path control. Complied with decision altitude. Position would have permitted a safe landing. Elevation did not exceed well above or well below glide path.

U Approach not in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Erratic corrections. Did not respond to controller's instructions. Did not comply with decision altitude and/or position would not have permitted a safe landing. Erratic glide path control. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 26B, ILS.

Q Approach was in accordance with published procedures. Smooth and timely corrections to azimuth and glide slope. Complied with decision altitude. Position would have permitted a safe landing. Maintained glide path with only minor deviations.

Q- Performed approach with minor deviations. Slow to make corrections. Slow to comply with decision altitude. Position would have permitted a safe landing. Improper glide path control.

U Approach not in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Erratic corrections. Did not comply with decision altitude and/or position at decision altitude would not have permitted a safe landing. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 26C, Cat II ILS. Same criteria as Sub-Area 26B. (PM Duties-FP)

Area 27, Non Precision Approach. Use the description and criteria below as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude at Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA), heading, course, timing and distance with all engines operating and adhere to Stabilized Approach Criteria in accordance with AFMAN 11-2C-17V3.

Q Approach was in accordance with published procedures. Used appropriate descent rate to arrive at MDA at or before Visual Descent Point (VDP). Position would have permitted a safe landing. Smooth and timely response to controller's instructions (ASR). If accomplishing a RNAV approach verify RAIM and RNAV mission computer data vs IAP (leg lengths, headings and altitudes).

Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS

MDA: +100/-0 feet

Course: +/-5 degrees at MAP (NDB, VOR, TACAN), less than one dot deflection (LOC, GPS)

Timing: Computed/adjusted timing to determine MAP within 20 seconds (when required).

Distance: Determined MAP within 0.5 NM prior or 0.5 NM after actual MAP.

Q- Performed approach with minor deviations. Arrived at MDA past the VDP but at or before the MAP in a position that would have permitted a safe landing. Slow to respond to controller's instructions and make corrections (ASR). Exceeded Q criteria but does not exceed:

MDA: +150/-50 feet

Course: +/-10 degrees at MAP (NDB, VOR, TACAN), from one dot deflection to less than two dots deflection (LOC, GPS)

Timing: Computed/adjusted timing to determine MAP within 30 seconds (when required)

Distance: Determined MAP within 1 NM prior or 0.5 NM after actual MAP.

U Approach not in accordance with published procedures. Maintained steady-state flight below the MDA. Position would not have permitted a safe landing. Failed to compute or adjust timing to determine MAP (when required). Failed to verify RAIM and RNAV mission computer data vs IAP (leg lengths, headings, and altitudes are accurate and within tolerances). Exceeded Q- criteria.

NOTE 1: Airspeed tolerances are based on computed approach speed.

NOTE 2: Add 5 KIAS to all engines operating criteria "fast" speed, 50 feet (when practical) and 2 degrees to all engines operating criteria for operations with an engine out criteria.

Area 28, Circling Approach.

Q Properly identified aircraft category for the approach and remained within the lateral limits for that category. Complied with controller's instructions. Attained runway alignment

without excessive bank angles. Did not descend from the MDA until in a position to place the aircraft on a normal glide path or execute a normal landing.

Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS

Altitude: +100/-0 feet

Q- Slow to identify aircraft category for the approach but remained within the lateral limits for that category. Slow to comply with controller's instructions. Attained runway alignment but occasionally required excessive bank angles or maneuvering.

Altitude: +150/-0 feet

U Did not properly identify aircraft category or exceeded the lateral limits of circling airspace. Did not comply with controller's instructions. Excessive maneuvering to attain runway alignment was potentially unsafe. Descended from the MDA before the aircraft was in a position for a normal glide path or landing. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Area 29, Missed Approach.

Q Executed missed approach in accordance with with published procedures. Complied with controller's instructions. Applied smooth control inputs.

Q- Executed missed approach with minor deviations to published procedures. Slow to comply with controller's instructions. Slightly over-controlled the aircraft.

U Did not execute missed approach in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Did not comply with controller's instructions. Deviation or misapplications of procedures could have led to an unsafe condition.

Table 2.4. Instructor.

Area 30, Instructor Ability (Critical).

Q Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided appropriate guidance when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected potentially unsafe maneuvers and/or situations.

U Unable to effectively communicate or provide timely feedback to the student. Gave instruction that was unsafe or contradicted published directives. Did not provide corrective action when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student problems. Did not identify an unsafe maneuver/situation in a timely manner. Made no attempt to instruct.

Area 31, Demonstration of Maneuvers (Critical).

Q Effectively demonstrated correct procedures, systems operation and/or flight maneuvers. Thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft systems, procedures, publications and directives.

U Ineffective or incorrect demonstration of procedures, systems operation and/or flight maneuvers. Insufficient depth of knowledge about applicable aircraft systems, procedures and/or proper source material.

Area 32, Student Briefing/Critique (Critical).

Q Briefings were well organized, accurate, and thorough. Reviewed student's present level of training and defined mission events to be performed. During the critique, demonstrated an effective ability to reconstruct the flight, offer mission analysis, and provide guidance, where appropriate. Training grade reflected the actual performance of the student relative to the standard. Pre-briefed the student's next mission, if required.

U Briefings were marginal or non-existent. Did not review student's past performance. Failed to adequately critique student or analyze the mission. Training grade did not reflect actual performance of student. Overlooked or omitted major discrepancies. Incomplete pre-briefing of student's next mission, if required.

Table 2.5. Mission.

Area 33, Aircraft Pre/Postflight Inspection/Mission Computer.

Q Accomplished required inspections in a thorough and proficient manner as outlined in applicable checklists and/or directives without deviations or omissions. Properly checked aircraft systems and components in accordance with flight manual and command guidance. Coordinated with ground support personnel. Correctly determined aircraft status. Appropriately set up mission computer in accordance with mission requirements.

Q- Minor deviations or omissions in the accomplishment of required inspections as outlined in applicable checklists and/or directives. Limited knowledge of proper procedures for checking aircraft systems/components in accordance with flight manual and command guidance. Limited coordination with ground support personnel. Difficulty in determining aircraft status. Errors in setting up mission computer that did not affect mission accomplishment.

U Failed to accomplish required inspections in a thorough and proficient manner. Major deviations or omissions. Omitted or improperly checked aircraft systems/components in accordance with flight manual and command guidance. Did not coordinate with ground support personnel. Unable to determine correct aircraft status. Unable to complete inspections without assistance or exceeded time allotted causing a mission delay. Significant errors in setting up mission computer that would cause mission failure.

Area 34, Radar Operations/Weather Avoidance/Windshear.

Q Effectively demonstrated procedures for operating weather radar. Updated weather radar/analysis throughout the mission. Knowledgeable of windshear detection and avoidance equipment. Used all available sources to determine if and to what degree severe weather conditions exist. Complied with all weather separation and windshear avoidance directives.

Q- Minor deviations observed when operating weather radar. Did not update radar/weather analysis during deteriorating weather conditions. Limited knowledge of windshear detection and avoidance equipment. Complied with all weather separation and windshear avoidance directives.

U Unable to demonstrate proper use of weather radar. Failed to update radar/weather analysis during the mission. Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of windshear detection and avoidance equipment. Failed to comply with weather separation or windshear avoidance directive that could have jeopardized safety or mission success.

Area 35, Approach.

Subarea 35A, VFR Pattern. Accomplish with aircraft only.

Q Performed traffic pattern and turn to final in accordance with published procedures. Aircraft control was smooth and positive. Cleared area of intended flight.

Q- Performed traffic pattern and turn to final with minor deviation to procedures as published/directed. Aircraft control was safe but not consistently smooth and positive. Over/under-shot final, but was able to intercept normal glide path.

U Did not perform traffic pattern and/or turn to final in accordance with published procedures. Displayed erratic aircraft control. Did not clear area of intended flight.

Subarea 35B, Normal Landing. Same as Area 15.

Subarea 35C, Assault Landing Zone (ALZ). (PM Duties-FP) Accomplish in aircraft only.

Q Maintained smooth approach path. Maintained constant control of flight path vector or made positive corrections. Touched down on centerline within the marked zone within published sink rate limitations. Maintained runway centerline during roll-out. Airspeed +/-5 knots. PM only: duties and callouts in accordance with flight manual and command guidance.

Q- Minor deviations to published procedures. Aircraft touched down within the landing zone but flight path vector wandered or corrections were not smooth or timely. Touchdown was off centerline, but not more than 15 feet from centerline. Airspeed +10/-5 knots. PM only: duties and callouts delayed and/or not in accordance with flight manual and command guidance but did not affect safety of flight.

U Touchdown short of the landing zone or landed beyond landing zone and did not execute a go-around. Exceeded published maximum sink rate limitations. Touched down off centerline by more than 15 feet. Exceeded Q- criteria. PM only: inappropriate actions would have affected safety of flight and/or failed to perform duties in accordance with flight manual and command guidance.

Subarea 35D, Mission Computer Approach.

Q Accurately programmed the mission computer with all required data. Demonstrated thorough knowledge of all MC approach procedures.

Q- Able to safely program the mission computer approach, but uncertain of some flight manual information/procedures regarding MC approaches.

U Unable to completely and accurately program the mission computer for an MC approach. Displayed little or no knowledge of flight manual procedures/information regarding MC approaches.

Subarea 35E, Full Flap VFR Approach. Full flap VFR approach and landing will be accomplished during all initial and recurring FP mission evaluations. Accomplish with aircraft only. May be combined with Sub-Area 35A, VFR Pattern.

Q Followed procedures as briefed. Smooth, positive control throughout the approach. Aircraft in position to intercept glide path to briefed touchdown zone. Cleared area of intended flight.

Q- Performed approach with minor deviations to published procedures. Aircraft control was not consistently positive and smooth. Over/under-shot final approach slightly but was able to intercept glide path to briefed touchdown zone.

U Approach not performed in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Displayed erratic aircraft control. Over/under-shot final approach leading to potentially unsafe maneuvering to intercept final. Did not clear area of intended flight.

Subarea 35F, NVG Approach.

Q Followed procedures as briefed. Smooth, positive control throughout the approach. Aircraft in position to intercept glide path to briefed touchdown zone. Cleared area of intended flight.

Q- Performed approach with minor deviations to published procedures. Aircraft control was not consistently positive and smooth. Over/under-shot final approach slightly but was able to intercept glide path to briefed touchdown zone.

U Approach not performed in accordance with directives or published procedures. Displayed erratic aircraft control. Over/under-shot final approach leading to potentially unsafe maneuvering to intercept final. Did not clear area of intended flight.

Subarea 35G, NVG Assault Landing Zone. (PM Duties-FP) If accomplished, this meets the requirement for Sub-Area 35C, Assault Landing Zone. Accomplish with aircraft only.

Q Maintained smooth approach path. Maintained constant control of flight path vector or made positive corrections. Touched down on centerline within the landing zone, within published sink rate limitations. Maintained runway centerline during roll-out. Airspeed +/-5 knots. PM only: duties and callouts in accordance with flight manual and command guidance.

Q- Minor deviations to published procedures. Aircraft touched down within the landing zone but flight path vector wandered or corrections were not smooth or timely. Touchdown was off centerline, but not more than 15 feet from centerline. Airspeed +10/-5 knots. PM only: duties and callouts delayed and/or not in accordance with flight manual and command guidance but did not affect safety of flight.

U Touchdown short of the landing zone or landed beyond landing zone and did not execute a go-around. Exceeded published maximum sink rate limitations. Touched down off centerline by more than 15 feet. Exceeded Q- criteria. PM only: inappropriate actions would have affected safety of flight and/or failed to perform duties in accordance with flight manual and command guidance.

Area 36, Combat Maneuvers.

Subarea 36A, Tactical Departure.

Q Followed procedures as briefed and/or required by tactical scenario. Smooth, positive control throughout the departure. Aircraft avoided/mitigated exposure to briefed/actual threat. Cleared area of intended flight.

Q- Performed departure with minor deviations to published procedures. Aircraft control was not consistently positive and smooth. Did not completely avoid/mitigate exposure to briefed/actual threat.

U Departure not performed in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Displayed erratic aircraft control. Failed to avoid and/or mitigate aircraft exposure to briefed/actual threat. Maneuvers to avoid a threat led to potentially unsafe maneuvering. Did not clear area of intended flight.

Subarea 36B, Tactical Arrival. Tactical approach to an ALZ will be accomplished by AC/IPs. Tactical approach to a normal runway will be accomplished by FPs. Accomplish with aircraft only.

Q Followed procedures as briefed and/or required by tactical scenario. Smooth, positive control throughout the recovery. Aircraft in position to intercept glide path to ALZ/normal runway. Cleared area of intended flight.

Q- Performed recovery with minor deviations to published procedures. Aircraft control was not consistently positive and smooth. Over/under-shot final approach but was able to intercept glide path to ALZ/normal runway.

U Recovery not performed in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Displayed erratic aircraft control. Over/under-shot final approach leading to potentially unsafe maneuvering to intercept final. Did not clear area of intended flight.

Subarea 36C, Low-Level Flying/Navigation/Timing Control.

Q Flew low-level route in accordance with briefed plan; deviations were for mission necessity (e.g., threat/traffic/bird avoidance, weather deviation, ATC instructions, time control, etc.). Thorough knowledge of en route time status in relation to objective area. Complied with all altitude restrictions. Adhered to all airspace restrictions. Demonstrated thorough knowledge of mission computer flight plan management. Entered and/or exited planned entry/exit points within 60 seconds of scheduled time.

Q- Unnecessarily deviated from briefed plan. Uncertain of exact aircraft position due to marginal mission computer flight plan knowledge. Better awareness of required timing events or en route time status could have avoided excessive, unplanned maneuvering. Entered and/or exited planned entry/exit points, exceeding Q criteria but within AP/1B or other established timing standards.

U Unable to maintain position awareness throughout most of the route. Unable to accurately assess required timing or unaware of mission time status, jeopardizing mission accomplishment. Violated airspace restrictions. Poor airspeed control resulted in numerous or extreme airspeed adjustment. Descended below minimum altitude restrictions. Major deviations from procedures that negatively affected mission accomplishment or flight safety. Unable to manage mission computer flight planning tasks. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 36D, Threat Avoidance Procedures.

Q Properly plotted and/or avoided a threat based on brief given by evaluator or intelligence personnel during mission planning/pre-brief. Properly responded to briefed/actual threats given by evaluator/command and control during the flight. Performed/demonstrated the appropriate AFTTP 3-1.C17A, *Tactical Employment C-17A (U)*, threat response procedures for the identified threat.

Q- Able to plot and/or avoid a threat with minimal help from other crew members. Slow to respond to briefed/actual threats. Slow to apply the correct AFTTP 3-1.C17A maneuver for the identified threat.

U Unable to plot and/or avoid a threat. Did not respond appropriately to briefed/actual threats or applied incorrect AFTTP 3-1.C17A maneuver that would have jeopardized the survivability of the aircraft. Flew through a known Tactical Avoidance Zone (TAZ).

Exception: During a training mission, it is acceptable to fly through a TAZ built on the pre-briefed threat scenario if deviating for weather or ATC instructions.

Area 37, Ground Operations.

Q Established and adhered to station, engine start, taxi, and takeoff time. Assured thorough preflight, check of personal equipment, crew/passenger briefings, etc. Accurately determined readiness of aircraft for flight. Conducted taxi operations in accordance with AFMAN 11-218, *Aircraft Operations and Movement on the Ground*, and local procedures.

Q- Same as above except for minor deviations that did not detract from mission effectiveness.

U Crew errors directly contributed to a late takeoff that degraded the mission. Failed to accurately determine readiness for flight.

Subarea 37A, Normal Taxi.

Q Appropriate power/speed management throughout taxi. Properly led turns and taxiway alignment during taxi. Appropriately placed available personnel for clearing in congested areas.

Q- Same as above except for minor deviations that did not detract from mission effectiveness.

U Errors in taxi speed or thrust management which detracted from mission effectiveness/safety. Violated taxi obstruction clearance criteria.

Subarea 37B, Star Turn/Reverse Taxi. Accomplish with aircraft only.

Q Provided complete briefing to crew defining roles and parameters of ground maneuvering. Solicited inputs from loadmaster and maintained communication. Applied proper power to maintain smooth control of the aircraft moving forward and in reverse. Stopped during backing in accordance with briefing or directions from the loadmaster.

Q- Same as above except for minor deviations (e.g., nose wheel scrubbing or abrupt braking) but did not detract from mission effectiveness.

U Errors in speed, thrust management or taxi obstruction clearance were unsafe.

Subarea 37C, ERO/Combat Offload.

Q Maintained positive coordination with the loadmaster and ground personnel ensuring clearance to offload and taxi considerations to follow. Ensured proper determination of accelerated gross weight and manual Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) setting. Smooth, effective braking and steering. Updated the mission computer in a timely manner.

Q- Unclear or vague briefings and minor deficiencies to include steering during combat offload and subsequent checklists. Minor errors in the update of the mission computer that did not affect mission accomplishment.

U Unsafe taxi or offload. Incorrectly updated mission computer.

Area 38, Receiver Air Refueling (A/R). Pilots will demonstrate sustained contact. Evaluate ACs in the left seat. Evaluate instructors in either seat (right seat for initial evaluation). Emergency boom latching and overrun procedures may be evaluated verbally. Accomplish with aircraft only. Verbally evaluate First Pilots on emergencies and positions.

Q Established and maintained proper refueling position. Aircraft control was positive and smooth. Demonstrated a complete knowledge of rendezvous and closure procedures. Performed all procedures in accordance with applicable checklists and other governing directives.

Q- Slow to recognize and apply needed corrections to establish and maintain proper refueling position. Aircraft control was not always positive and smooth, but was adequate. Accomplished rendezvous and closure with deviations that did not affect safety of flight or the successful completion of air refueling. Performed all procedures in accordance with applicable checklists and other governing directives with only minor omissions or deviations.

U Erratic or dangerous in the pre-contact/refueling position. Had deviations/omissions that affected safety of flight and/or successful completion of air refueling. Did not perform all procedures in accordance with applicable checklists and other governing directives or omitted major items. Exceeded Q- limits.

Area 39, Formation Receiver Air Refueling Procedures.

Subarea 39A, Formation Receiver A/R Lead.

Q Smooth control inputs. Appropriate wingman consideration. Complied with all restrictions. Made all required reports. Applied course/heading corrections promptly. Able to successfully program and execute all required mission computer/AFCS procedures.

Q- Minor deviations in navigation. Slow to comply with controlling agency instructions or unsure of reporting requirements. Slow to apply course/heading corrections. Marginal wingman consideration which made it difficult for wingmen to maintain position. Limited knowledge of mission computer and AFCS procedures.

U Not flown in accordance with flight manuals and/or governing directives. Lack of wingman consideration. Unable to program mission computer.

Subarea 39B, Formation Receiver A/R Wingman.

Q Smooth control inputs. Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Maintained appropriate separation and complied with leader's instructions. Smooth, timely

rejoin. Displayed complete understanding of relationship between mission computer, SKE/FFS and AFCS systems.

Q- Minor deviations to published procedures. Over-controlled the aircraft to the extent that formation position varied considerably. Slow to respond to leader's instructions. Slow to rejoin. Slow to respond to loss of "coupled" SKE/FFS wing position.

U Procedures not in accordance with flight manual and/or governing directives. Abrupt position corrections. Did not maintain safe separation or formation position. Failed to comply with leader's instructions. Unsafe rejoin. Unable to achieve AFCS SKE /FFS capture criteria.

Area 40, Formation/Airdrop.

Subarea 40A, Formation/Airdrop Planning.

Q Correctly identified factors affecting formation/airdrop mission accomplishment. Applied appropriate tactics to avoid/mitigate briefed/actual threats. Correctly planned the route of flight. Coordinated mission with required agencies. Passed information to formation members in a timely manner. Planned mission in accordance with flight manual and governing Aircrew e-Pubs publications/directives.

Q- Identified most of the factors affecting formation/airdrop mission but did not negatively affect mission accomplishment. Unfamiliar with appropriate tactic for a given scenario. Minor errors in route construction, threat analysis or tactics selection. Minor omissions in coordination with required agencies that did not affect mission accomplishment. Plan included minor deviations from the flight manual and/or governing directives that did not negatively affect mission accomplishment.

U Failed to identify factors that negatively impacted formation/airdrop mission accomplishment. Made major errors in threat analysis or route construction. Could not safely fly planned profile. Did not contact appropriate agencies. Did not pass critical information to other formation members. Poor planning resulted in an unsuccessful mission. Plan included significant deviations from the flight manual and/or governing directives which would negatively affect mission accomplishment and/or safe execution of flight.

Subarea 40B, Formation/Crew Briefing.

Q All required briefings accomplished in accordance with briefing guides. Adequate information relayed to safely conduct formation and airdrop operations.

Q- All required briefings accomplished in accordance with briefing guides. Some pertinent information was missing from the briefings but did not result in unsafe operations.

U Required briefings not accomplished or lacked pertinent information necessary for safe operation.

Subarea 40C, Lead (PF or PM).

Q Smooth control inputs. Appropriate wingman consideration. Complied with all restrictions or controlling agency instructions. Made all required reports. Applied course/heading corrections promptly. Able to successfully program and execute all required mission computer/AFCS procedures.

Q- Minor deviations in navigation. Slow to comply with controlling agency instructions or unsure of reporting requirements. Slow to apply course/heading corrections. Marginal wingman consideration made it difficult for wingmen to maintain position. Limited knowledge of mission computer and AFCS procedures.

U Not flown in accordance with flight manuals and/or governing directives. Lack of wingman consideration. Unable to program mission computer.

Subarea 40D, Wingman.

Q Smooth control inputs. Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Maintained appropriate separation and complied with leader's instructions. Smooth, timely rejoin. Displayed complete understanding of relationship between mission computer, SKE/FFS and AFCS systems.

Q- Minor deviations to published procedures. Over-controlled the aircraft to the extent that formation position varied considerably. Formation position was not properly maintained, but did not affect formation integrity/mission accomplishment. Slow to recognize/correct deviations to formation position. Slow to respond to leader's instructions. Slow to rejoin. Slow to respond to loss of "coupled" SKE/FFS wing position.

U Procedures not in accordance with flight manuals and/or governing directives. Rough on controls/abrupt position corrections. Did not maintain safe separation or formation position. Failed to comply with leader's instructions. Unsafe rejoin. Unable to achieve AFCS SKE/FFS capture criteria. Failed to recognize a no-drop situation.

Subarea 40E, Knowledge of Formation/Airdrop Procedures.

Q Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of formation/airdrop procedures. Applied appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from regulatory guidance to execute assigned mission.

Q- Minor lapses in knowledge of formation/airdrop procedures. Incorrectly applied TTPs but did not detract from mission accomplishment. Errors during flight profile did not jeopardize safety of formation.

U Did not have appropriate understanding of formation/airdrop procedures. Failed to apply TTPs that may have led to mission failure. Significant errors during flight profile would have jeopardized safety of the formation.

Subarea 40F, Visual Procedures. Accomplish with aircraft only.

Q Smooth control inputs. Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Maintained good separation with other formation aircraft. Able to maintain safe altitude and airspeed in formation. Displayed complete understanding of visual formation procedures.

Q- Minor deviations to published procedures. Over-controlled the aircraft to the extent that formation position varied considerably. Slow to correct position. Lacked complete understanding of visual procedures, but did not jeopardize safety of aircraft or formation aircraft.

U Procedures not in accordance with flight manuals, directives or published procedures. Abrupt position corrections. Did not maintain safe separation or formation position. Failed to recognize unsafe situations.

Subarea 40G, SKE/FFS Procedures.

Q Smooth control inputs. Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Maintained good separation with other formation aircraft. Able to successfully pass and receive SKE/FFS information. Displayed complete understanding of relationship between mission computer, SKE/FFS and AFCS systems.

Q- Minor deviations to published procedures. Over-controlled the aircraft to the extent that formation position varied considerably. Slow to pass or respond to SKE/FFS information. Did not have complete understanding of SKE/FFS equipment or SKE/FFS procedures.

U Procedures not in accordance with flight manuals, directives or published procedures. Abrupt position corrections. Did not maintain safe separation or formation position. Failed to comply with leader's instructions or pass required SKE/FFS information. Unable to achieve AFCS SKE/FFS capture criteria. Failed to recognize unsafe situations.

Subarea 40H, Formation Low-Level Procedures. Use Subarea 36C criteria and the following:

Q Appropriately managed formation position within the low-level environment. Actual time over target (TOT) was within 60 seconds of planned TOT.

Q- Mismanagement of formation position within the low-level environment but did not affect formation safety. Actual TOT outside of Q criteria but within other established timing standards.

U Excessive mismanagement of formation position within the low-level environment which could have jeopardized formation safety. Actual TOT outside of Q- criteria.

Subarea 40I, Visual Run-in/Drop/Escapes.

Q Initiated slowdown and configured airplane as required. Maintained appropriate airdrop altitude and airspeeds. Correctly identified the drop zone (DZ) and made appropriate corrections to fine-tune track. If required, correct no-drop actions performed. Initiated escape procedures and post-drop checklists at appropriate times. Maneuvered in accordance with established guidance. Maintained drop altitude within +50/-0 feet.

Q- Minor deviations from direct course to the Computed Air Release Point (CARP) did not detract from airdrop effectiveness. Slow to initiate slow-down procedures or properly configure the airplane. Slow to identify DZ despite clear marking and sufficient landmarks. Slow to initiate escape procedures or post-drop checklists. Minor deviations in maneuvering did not detract from mission performance or jeopardize flight safety. Exceeded Q criteria, but not more than +100/-50 feet from drop altitude.

U Unable to establish course to the CARP. Failed to slow down as directed or configure the airplane appropriately. Unable to identify the DZ due to poor technique or pilot error. Did not maintain proper alignment or unaware of alignment error. Mission not accomplished due to poor DZ acquisition, alignment or deviation from procedure caused by pilot error or

omission. Failed to activate proper air delivery switches and lights causing unsatisfactory drop or not stopping jumpers from exiting the aircraft at the end of usable DZ. Failed to perform escape procedures or accomplish post-drop activities. Major deviations from established procedure precluded safe mission accomplishment. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 40J, Visual Formation Recovery.

Q Rolled out on final in position to intercept glide path to touchdown.

Q- Rolled out on final high or drug-in but able to make a normal landing. Slow to recognize need for an unplanned go-around. Slow to initiate unplanned go-around. Unplanned go-around due to poor pilot procedure or technique.

U Rolled out on final in position requiring go-around due to poor pilot procedure or technique. Did not initiate unplanned go-around when required.

Subarea 40K, Formation Landing. NOTE: Use Area 15, Landings criteria and the following:

Q Good formation position throughout landing. Followed briefed procedures for reversing and braking.

Q- Landing separation exceeded 16,000-feet for SKE/FFS or 75 seconds for visual landings. Long landing interval did not cause following aircraft to execute go-around/missed approach.

U Attempted to touchdown with less than 10,000-feet (SKE/FFS) or 45 seconds (visual) spacing from the previous aircraft. Long landing interval caused following aircraft to execute go-around/missed approach. Did not follow briefed reversing and braking procedures.

Area 41, En Route Evaluation. NOTE: For use on OME only. Accomplish with aircraft only.

Subarea 41A, Aircraft Commander Responsibilities.

Q Effectively determined equipment required for mission and coordinated for waiver to operate with degraded capability, if required. Consistently decided to start, continue or delay mission based on input from appropriate sources. Kept command and control (C2) agencies apprised of mission status changes. Effectively coordinated support activities to ensure timely mission activity flow.

Q- Occasionally misinterpreted maintenance status regarding mission requirements, but did not significantly impact mission accomplishment. Unsure of procedures to obtain waiver to operate with degraded capability. Slow to make decisions regarding mission continuation. Did not consistently communicate status and intentions to C2 functions. Poor coordination with support agencies disrupted mission flow.

U Unable to determine equipment or waiver required for mission performance. Failed to make proper decision to start, continue or delay mission and/or did not communicate mission-essential information to C2 agencies. Ineffective support function coordination precluded mission accomplishment.

Subarea 41B, En Route Procedures.

Q Continually coordinated crew activities during flight (e.g., work/rest plans) to maximize mission effectiveness. Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Possessed a high level of knowledge of all applicable aircraft publications and other governing directives and understood how to apply both to enhance fuel conservation. Successfully applied fuel conservation procedures in all areas of the mission.

Q- Slow to coordinate crew activities during flight or ineffective use of crew resources. Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Possessed some knowledge of applicable aircraft publications and other governing directives and understood how to apply both to enhance fuel conservation. Successfully applied some fuel conservation procedures, but failed to apply fuel conservation procedures in all areas of the mission.

U Did not coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission accomplishment may not be possible. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission. Unaware of fuel conservation procedures. Failed to apply any fuel conservation procedures in any area of the mission.

Subarea 41C, Descent/Arrival.

Q Effective planning and coordination among crew members provided for smooth arrival. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives.

Q- Slow to plan or coordinate arrival activities. Deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival. Late communication with C2 agencies.

U Could not plan or coordinate for successful arrival. Failed to coordinate crew activities. Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance.

Subarea 41D, Post-Flight/RON Procedures.

Q Accomplished all post-flight activities in a timely manner. Coordinated with C2 agencies for subsequent mission taskings. Managed crew activities during crew rest to provide necessary rest and crew member availability.

Q- Slow to perform post-flight duties. Marginal coordination with C2 agencies.

U Could not accomplish post-flight duties without impacting subsequent mission. Failed to coordinate mission requirements and/or taskings with C2 agencies. Poor management of crew during crew rest phase, which impacted (i.e., delayed) the aircrew's availability.

Subarea 41E, Authentication/Aircraft Security.

Q Demonstrated thorough knowledge of authentication documents and procedures. Ensured aircraft security in accordance with current directives and/or mission tasking requirements.

Q- Displayed satisfactory knowledge of authentication documents and procedures. Limited understanding of aircraft security requirements, but complied with basic security directives.

U Unable to demonstrate proper use of authentication materials. Unaware of requirements for aircraft security. Did not ensure basic security measures taken.

Table 2.6. PNAF.

Area 42, Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF).

Subarea 42A, General PNAF Procedures.

Q Correctly demonstrated general PNAF procedures (actual or simulated) to include mission planning, hot arrival/departure, weapon inspection, aircrew arming, post-mission duties and Command Disable System (CDS) procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Q- With minor deviations/difficulty, adequately demonstrated general PNAF procedures (actual or simulated) to include mission planning, hot arrival/departure, weapon inspection, aircrew arming, post-mission duties, and CDS procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unsatisfactorily demonstrated general PNAF procedures (actual or simulated) to include mission planning, hot arrival/departure, weapon inspection, aircrew arming, post-mission duties, and CDS procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Subarea 42B, Two Person Concept (TPC) (Critical).

Q Satisfactorily demonstrated proper adherence and enforcement of the TPC (actual or simulated) in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unsatisfactorily demonstrated proper adherence and/or enforcement of the TPC (actual or simulated) in accordance with PNAF directives.

Subarea 42C, Emergency/Contingency Procedures.

Q Satisfactorily explained or demonstrated PNAF related emergency/contingency procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Q- Difficulty explaining or demonstrating PNAF related emergency/contingency procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unable to explain or demonstrate PNAF related emergency or contingency procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Subarea 42D, Operations Security (OPSEC) (Critical).

Q Satisfactorily demonstrated proper adherence to OPSEC procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unsatisfactorily demonstrated proper adherence to OPSEC procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Subarea 42E, Aircraft Commander Procedures (PNAF AC only).

Q Correctly demonstrated PNAF Aircraft Commander procedures (actual or simulated) to include adherence to the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG)/Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG) supplement (may be verbally evaluated), Mission Setup Message compliance, supervising T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 loading/offloading procedures, and Command and Control (C2) interface in accordance with PNAF directives.

Q- With minor deviations/difficulty, adequately demonstrated PNAF Aircraft Commander procedures (actual or simulated) to include adherence to the FCG/SWOG, Mission Setup Message compliance, T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 loading/offloading procedures, and C2 interface in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unsatisfactorily demonstrated PNAF Aircraft Commander procedures (actual or simulated) to include adherence to the FCG/SWOG, Mission Setup Message compliance, T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 loading/offloading procedures, and C2 interface in accordance with PNAF directives.

Subarea 42F, Courier Procedures (PNAF AC & Courier).

Q Correctly demonstrated PNAF Courier procedures (actual or simulated) to include aircraft sanitization (may be verbally evaluated), security (Type-I/II), Entry Authority List (EAL), Sole Vouching Authority (SVA), and custody transfer procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Q- With minor deviations/difficulty, adequately demonstrated PNAF Courier procedures (actual or simulated) to include aircraft sanitization, security (Type-I/II), EAL, SVA, and custody transfer procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unsatisfactorily demonstrated PNAF Courier procedures (actual or simulated) to include aircraft sanitization, security (Type-I/II), EAL, SVA, and custody transfer procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Table 2.7. SOLL II.

Area 43 Special Operations Low-Level (SOLL II).

Subarea 43A, NVG Takeoff and Rejoin.

Q Maintained smooth, positive aircraft control throughout the takeoff. Performed the takeoff in accordance with published directives. Accomplished rejoin to correct formation position with only momentary deviations.

Q- Minor deviations from published procedures without affecting safety of flight. Control was rough or erratic. Hesitant in application of procedures/corrections. Formation position varied considerably. Slow to correct position.

U Takeoff was potentially dangerous. Exceeded aircraft systems/limitations. Failed to establish proper climb attitude. Excessive deviation from intended flight path. Violated flight manual procedures. Did not maintain safe separation. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 43B, NVG Approach and Landing.

Q Performed landings as published/directed in accordance with flight manual and met the following criteria:

Airspeed: +5/-5 KIAS

Touchdown zone: Landed in marked zone. AMP-4 – Landed prior to go around timing called by JS.

Centerline: +/- 15 feet left or right

Q- Performed landings with minor deviation to procedures as published/directed. Landed in a slight crab. Exceeded Q criteria but not the following:

Touchdown zone: Landed slightly outside of marked zone. AMP-4 – Landed after go around timing expired

Centerline: +/- 25 feet left or right

U Not performed as published/directed. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 43C, Low-Level/Time Control.

Q Maintained positive awareness of aircraft position throughout flight. Complied with all altitude restrictions. Adhered to all airspace restrictions. Met all en route points and performed TOA or TOT maneuvers within specified Task, Conditions and Standards (TCS) (30 second) tolerances.

Q- Uncertain of exact aircraft position due to marginal mission computer flight plan knowledge or pilot navigation. Met all en route points and performed TOA or TOT maneuvers slightly outside of specified TCS (30 second) tolerances.

U Unable to maintain position awareness throughout most of route. Performed maneuvers grossly outside of 30 second tolerances or multiple smaller occurrences slightly outside of TCS spacing. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 43D, Hi – Lo Profile.

Q Performed as published/directed in accordance with flight manual and published instructions and directives. Demonstrated excellent vertical velocity schedule/airspeed control.

Airspeed: +/- 10 KIAS

VVI: +/- 200 ft/min of planned schedule

Q- Minor deviations from profile procedures that did not affect mission accomplishment or compromise safety.

Airspeed: +/- 15 KIAS

VVI: +/- 500 ft/min of planned schedule

U Failed to analyze deviations or take proper corrective actions. Not performed as published/ directed. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 43E, Jump Pilot Drop.

Q Performed as directed in accordance with published directives. Demonstrated excellent guidance to LS pilot to successfully complete the drop. Release point within 300 yds/4 seconds of computed CARP.

Q- Minor deviations from procedures that did not affect mission accomplishment or compromise safety. Release point within 600 yds/8 seconds of computed CARP.

U Failed to analyze deviations or properly guide LS pilot to proper release point. Major deviations or misapplication of procedures. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 43F, PDA/No Logic Drop.

Q Performed as directed in accordance with published directives. For PDA, pilot successfully airdropped within 300 yds/4 seconds of computed CARP.

Q- Minor deviations from procedures that did not affect mission accomplishment or compromise safety. For PDA, release point within 600 yds/8 seconds of computed CARP.

U Deviations from procedures were such to compromise safety. For PDA, pilot failed to analyze deviations or properly guide aircraft to proper release point. Major deviations or misapplication of procedures. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Subarea 43G, Formation SOLL II Personnel Drop.

Q Maintained formation position through slowdown. Flew to appropriate CARP while maintaining correct separation with respect to other aircraft. Both aircraft reached their release point within the allowable longitudinal position for crosswinds. Maintained correct alignment for duration of drop zone.

Q- Minor deviations from procedures that did not affect mission accomplishment or compromise safety. Both aircraft arrived at release point just outside of allowable longitudinal position.

U Deviations from procedures were such to compromise safety. Failed to arrive at correct CARP or the #2 aircraft crossed release point far outside of longitudinal position. Exceeded Q- criteria.

2.10. Unit. Units will include MAJCOM-specific and local evaluation areas in **Chapter 4**. Include the evaluation areas on AF Form 3862 (see **paragraph 1.10**).

Chapter 3

LOADMASTER EVALUATIONS

3.1. General. The C-17 loadmaster evaluation process allows commanders maximum flexibility. This chapter standardizes initial, periodic, and requalification evaluation requirements for qualification/mission, additional mission, and instructor evaluations. Qualification/mission and additional mission qualifications require an expiration date of qualification in accordance with AFI 11-202V2. Instructor qualification does not have an expiration date of qualification.

3.2. Qualification/Mission (QUAL/MSN) Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification). Qualification and mission evaluation requirements are completed concurrently. A QUAL/MSN evaluation qualifies the loadmaster to perform operations on the C-17 and is primary to all other qualifications or certifications.

3.2.1. Initial, periodic, and requalification evaluations require the examinee to perform applicable preflight and loading preparation checklists, cargo onload, inflight duties, cargo offload, and post flight duties. **(T-2).** Initial evaluations will include all areas under GENERAL and QUALIFICATION/MISSION. Periodic and requalification evaluations due to expiration date of qualification will include all areas under GENERAL, QUALIFICATION/MISSION and INSTRUCTOR (if applicable). **(T-1).**

3.2.2. Initial QUAL/MSN evaluations. Initial QUAL/MSN evaluations will be evaluated on a single mission. **(T-3).** Upon successful completion of the evaluation, annotate the AF Form 8 crew position as “ML,” the flight phase as “INIT QUAL/MSN,” and ensure expiration date is correct.

3.2.3. Periodic QUAL/MSN evaluations. Unless stated in mission execution order, periodic QUAL/MSN evaluations may be conducted on any variant of operational or training mission with unit commander approval. Annotate the AF Form 8 under the flight phase as “QUAL/MSN.”

3.2.3.1. Combination evaluations. QUAL/MSN evaluations may be combined with periodic additional mission evaluations.

3.2.3.2. If both QUAL/MSN and AD periodic evaluations are successfully completed on the same flight or mission, use a single line entry, and annotate the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “QUAL/MSN (AD).” The airdrop load satisfies the cargo onload and offload requirements.

3.2.3.3. If both QUAL/MSN evaluation and SOLL II evaluations are conducted on the same flight or mission, use a single line entry, and annotate the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “QUAL/MSN (SOLL II).”

3.2.3.4. If QUAL/MSN, AD, and SOLL II evaluations are conducted on the same flight or mission, use a single line entry, and annotate the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “QUAL/MSN (AD – SOLL II).”

3.2.3.5. If both QUAL/MSN and PNAF evaluations are conducted on the same flight or mission, use a single line entry, and annotate the AF Form 8 under the flight phase as “QUAL/MSN (PNAF).”

3.2.4. Requalification QUAL/MSN evaluations. To remedy a failed periodic QUAL/MSN evaluation, the profile will be as directed by the unit commander but will include, at a minimum, areas for which the individual became unqualified. **(T-2)**. Annotate the AF Form 8 under the flight phase as “RQ QUAL/MSN.”

3.3. Additional Mission Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification). Additional missions are assigned to units by representative MAJCOM. Obtaining an additional mission qualification requires unit commander approval. Additional mission qualifications are dependent upon maintaining a QUAL/MSN qualification. If unqualified in QUAL/MSN, additional missions shall not be performed unsupervised until a successful RQ QUAL/MSN evaluation is accomplished. An additional mission disqualification does not impact primary QUAL/MSN performance. If unqualified in AD, SOLL II airdrop shall not be performed unsupervised until a successful RQ evaluation is accomplished. If unqualified in SOLL II due to an airdrop event, AD shall not be performed unsupervised until a successful RQ evaluation is accomplished.

3.3.1. Airdrop (AD). Initial, periodic, and requalification AD evaluations require the examinee to perform applicable airdrop preflight and loading preparation checklists, rigging, pre-slowdown through post drop checklists, and shall be conducted performing actual heavy equipment airdrop. **(T-1)**. Initial evaluations will include all areas under GENERAL and AIRDROP. Periodic and requalification evaluations due to expiration of qualification will include all areas under GENERAL, AIRDROP and INSTRUCTOR (if applicable). **(T-1)**.

3.3.1.1. Initial AD evaluations. Initial AD evaluations will include an actual sequential platform equipment airdrop. **(T-2)**. **Exception:** A single platform airdrop may be accomplished if the examinee demonstrates sequential platform rigging. CDS and personnel airdrop procedures shall be evaluated verbally or by actual demonstration. **(T-2)**. All other types of airdrop that the individual will be certified to accomplish shall be verbally evaluated. Annotate the AF Form 8 under the flight phase as “INIT MSN (AD).”

3.3.1.2. Periodic AD evaluations. Periodic AD evaluations should include an actual sequential platform airdrop. A single platform airdrop may be accomplished if the examinee demonstrates sequential platform rigging. CDS and personnel airdrop procedures shall be evaluated verbally or by actual demonstration. **(T-2)**. All other types of airdrop that the individual is certified to accomplish should be verbally evaluated. A periodic evaluation may be credited if an unplanned no-drop is called after completion of the Slowdown Checklist provided the no-drop was not due to loadmaster error. Annotate the AF Form 8 under the flight phase as “MSN (AD).”

3.3.1.2.1. Multiple periodic AD evaluations may be administered on the same flight/sortie provided each loadmaster accomplishes the applicable airdrop preflight and loading preparation checklists, rigging, and the pre-slowdown through post drop checklists.

3.3.1.2.2. Periodic AD evaluations may be accomplished on a SOLL II training sortie using T.O. 1C-17A-1-5, *Special Operations Crew Manual*, procedures. When this is accomplished T.O. 1C-17A-1-4, *Airdrop Mission Crew Manual*, standard/emergency procedures will be verbally evaluated and annotated on the AF Form 8. **(T-2)**. Both the examiner and examinee will be SOLL II qualified. **(T-2)**.

3.3.1.2.3. Periodic AD evaluations may be combined with a SOLL II evaluation. If both AD and SOLL II evaluations are successfully completed on the same flight, use a single line entry, and annotate the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “MSN (AD – SOLL II).”

3.3.1.3. Requalification AD evaluations. To remedy a failed periodic AD evaluation, the profile will be as directed by the unit commander but will include, as a minimum, areas for which the individual became unqualified. **(T-2)**. A requalification evaluation may be credited if an unplanned no-drop is called after completion of the Slowdown Checklist provided the no-drop was not due to loadmaster error. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “RQ MSN (AD).”

3.3.1.4. Requalification of an airdrop event. Lapse of currency that led to loss of qualification in a single event requires a requalification evaluation in accordance with AFMAN 11-2C-17V1. Accomplish a RQ SPOT evaluation for the event that requires an evaluation. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “RQ SPOT.”

3.3.2. Special Operations Low-Level II (SOLL II). Initial, periodic, and requalification SOLL II evaluations require the examinee to perform applicable SOLL II preflight and loading preparation checklists, cargo onload, inflight duties, cargo offload, and post flight duties. **(T-1)**. Initial evaluations will include all areas under GENERAL and SOLL II. Periodic and requalification evaluations due to expiration of qualification will include all areas under GENERAL, SOLL II and INSTRUCTOR (if applicable). **(T-1)**.

3.3.2.1. Initial SOLL II evaluations. Initial SOLL II evaluations will be conducted on an operational mission or training exercise (i.e., bi-lat, multi-lat, etc.). **(T-1)**. **Exception:** Initial SOLL II evaluations may be accomplished on a local special operations training sortie if the examinee has participated in an operational mission or training exercise. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “INIT MSN (SOLL II).”

3.3.2.2. Periodic SOLL II evaluations. Unless stated in mission execution order, periodic SOLL II evaluations may be conducted on any variant of operational or training mission with unit commander approval. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “MSN (SOLL II).”

3.3.2.3. Requalification SOLL II evaluations. To remedy a failed periodic SOLL II evaluation, the profile will be as directed by the unit commander but will include, as a minimum, areas for which the individual became unqualified. **(T-2)**. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “RQ MSN (SOLL II).”

3.3.2.4. Requalification of a SOLL II event. Lapse of currency that led to loss of qualification in a single event requires a requalification evaluation in accordance with AFMAN 11-2C-17V1. Accomplish a RQ SPOT evaluation for the event that requires an evaluation. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “RQ SPOT.”

3.3.3. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF). Initial, periodic, and requalification PNAF evaluations require the examinee to perform applicable PNAF preflight and loading preparation checklists, cargo onload, inflight duties, cargo offload, and post flight duties. **(T-1)**. Initial evaluations will include all areas under GENERAL and PNAF. Periodic and requalification evaluations due to expiration of qualification will include all areas under GENERAL, PNAF and INSTRUCTOR (if applicable). **(T-1)**.

3.3.3.1. Initial PNAF evaluations. Initial PNAF evaluations will include all aspects of the PNAF mission and simulate procedures for transportation of nuclear cargo utilizing T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, but will not be conducted on missions carrying actual nuclear cargo in accordance with AFMAN 13-526. **(T-1)**. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “INIT MSN (PNAF).”

3.3.3.2. Periodic PNAF evaluations. Periodic PNAF evaluations should be accomplished on missions with actual or live munitions to the maximum extent possible. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “MSN (PNAF).”

3.3.3.3. Requalification PNAF evaluations. To remedy a failed periodic PNAF evaluation, the profile will be as directed by the unit commander but will include, as a minimum, areas for which the individual became unqualified. **(T-2)**. Annotate on the AF Form 8 under flight phase as “RQ MSN (PNAF).”

3.4. Instructor (IL) Evaluations (Initial, Periodic, and Requalification). Initial, periodic, and requalification evaluations require the examinee to demonstrate instructor ability by providing instruction to an actual student. When students are not available or mission requirements/crew composition requirements prevent inclusion of students, the flight examiner may serve in that capacity. All IL evaluations will include areas under INSTRUCTOR. Certified evaluators will be evaluated to an instructor level. **(T-1)**.

3.4.1. Initial instructor evaluations. To initially qualify as an instructor, the crew member must successfully complete a dedicated initial IL evaluation. **(T-1)**. Loadmasters will not realign their QUAL/MSN evaluation during the initial IL evaluation. Upon successful completion of the initial IL evaluation, annotate the AF Form 8 under the crew position as “IL,” and the flight phase as “INIT INSTR.”

3.4.2. Periodic IL evaluations. Loadmasters who maintain an IL qualification will be evaluated in instructor areas during all subsequent periodic evaluations. **(T-2)**. A separate IL evaluation is not required.

3.4.3. Requalification IL evaluations. To remedy a failed IL evaluation, the profile will be as directed by the unit commander. **(T-1)**.

3.4.3.1. For requalification evaluations to remedy only the IL qualification, annotate the AF Form 8 under crew position as “IL,” and the flight phase as “RQ INSTR.”

3.4.3.2. If regaining the IL qualification during a periodic QUAL/MSN evaluation, annotate the AF Form 8 under the crew position as “IL,” and flight phase as “QUAL/MSN/RQ INSTR.”

3.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluations (EPE). Evaluate a loadmaster’s knowledge of emergency procedures and systems on all initial and periodic evaluations. Accomplish the EPE during the ground evaluation, inflight or in the ATD.

3.6. AF Form 8 Mission Description. In addition to the requirements identified in AFI 11-202V2, the Mission Description on the AF Form 8 will include the following.

3.6.1. Type of mission/sortie profile.

3.6.2. Description of cargo.

3.7. Additional Information. Flight examiners will not conduct evaluations when scheduled as primary aircrew members. (T-1).

3.8. Loadmaster Grading Criteria.

Table 3.1. General.

Area 1, Directives and Publications.

Q Possessed a high level of knowledge of all applicable aircraft T.O.s and publications/directives in Aircrew ePubs. Understood how to apply both to enhance mission accomplishment. Required publications (paper and electronic) were current and properly posted.

Q- Unsure of some directives but could locate information in appropriate publications. Required publications (paper and electronic) were current but improperly posted.

U Unaware of established directives and/or could not locate them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Required publications (paper or electronic) were not current.

Area 2, Mission Preparation/Planning.

Q Read and initialed for all items in Flight Crew Information File (FCIF). Completed/obtained all applicable forms. Complied with all local directives. Satisfactorily participated in mission planning and attended required briefings. Possessed all required equipment and/or documents for the mission.

Q- Same as above except for minor deviations or omissions which would not impair mission effectiveness. Did not fully comply with local directives.

U FCIF was not reviewed, initialed, or applied. Failed to attend required briefings. Failed to obtain/complete all applicable forms, or made major errors or omissions. Did not obtain adequate mission information. Did not possess all required equipment and/or documents for the mission. Failed to comply with local directives. Lack of planning/preparation resulted in mission delay or failure.

Area 3, Use of Checklists.

Q Procedures and checklist items required by flight manual and applicable directives were accomplished in a thorough and proficient manner.

Q- Procedures and checklist items required by flight manuals and applicable directives were accomplished with omission, deviation, or error, which detracted from the overall efficient conduct of the mission. Performance was the minimum acceptable.

U Procedures or checklist items required by flight manual and applicable directives were accomplished with omissions, deviations, or errors which did, or could adversely affect the successful accomplishment of the mission or task.

Area 4, Safety Consciousness (Critical).

Q Aware of and complied with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation and mission accomplishment.

U Not aware of or did not comply with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation or mission accomplishment. Operated aircraft or equipment in a dangerous manner.

Area 5, Judgment/Compliance (Critical).

Q Prepared and completed mission in compliance with existing regulations and directives. Demonstrated knowledge of operating procedures and restrictions and where to find them in the correct publications.

U Unaware of established procedures and/or could not locate them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Failed to comply with a procedure that could have jeopardized safety or mission success.

Area 6, Crew Resource Management (CRM)/Threat and Error Management (TEM). In accordance with AFI 11-290, applicable MAJCOM supplements, and AMC Form 4031.

Q Proactively applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts throughout the flight/mission. Ensured safe/effective mission accomplishment by anticipating, recognizing, and mitigating relevant threats. Identified and mitigated own and other crew members' errors via the proper use of monitoring/crosschecking procedures and through the employment of applicable, established VVM practices/procedures.

Q- Reactively and inconsistently, or inadequately applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts but did not allow those deficiencies to detract from mission accomplishment and/or flight safety. Unreliably and/or inadequately anticipated, identified, or mitigated relevant threats and/or own or other crew members' inconsequential errors.

U Did not apply appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts to ensure safe/effective mission accomplishment. Failed to anticipate, identify, or mitigate relevant threats and/or own or other crew members' consequential errors.

Area 7, Communication Procedures.

Q Displayed a satisfactory knowledge of, and compliance with, correct communication procedures. Transmissions were concise and used proper terminology. Accomplished required calls and acknowledged transmissions in a manner which enhanced mission effectiveness.

Q- Displayed adequate communication procedures, but was slow or not concise in making transmissions. Transmissions contained erroneous information or included non-standard terminology. Mission effectiveness was not jeopardized.

U Incorrect procedures or poor performance caused confusion and jeopardized mission accomplishment. Omitted required transmissions or transmitted erroneous information.

Area 8, Life Support Systems/Egress.

Q Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Demonstrated and/or emphasized the proper operating procedures used to operate aircraft egress devices such as doors, windows, hatches, and escape ropes.

Q- Limited knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Unsure of the proper operating procedures used to operate some of the aircraft egress devices.

U Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Unable to properly operate aircraft egress devices.

Area 9, Knowledge/Completion of Forms.

Q All required forms were complete, accurate, legible, and accomplished on time and in accordance with applicable directives. Related an accurate debrief of significant events to applicable agencies (Safety, Maintenance, etc.)

Q- Minor errors on forms that did not affect conduct of the mission. Incorrectly or incompletely reported some information due to minor errors, omissions, and/or deviations.

U Did not accomplish required forms. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant information due to major errors, omissions, and/or deviations.

Area 10, Airmanship (Critical).

Q Executed the assigned mission in a timely, efficient manner. Demonstrated strict professional flight and crew discipline throughout all phases of flight. Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension.

U Decisions, or lack thereof, resulted in failure to accomplish the assigned mission. Failed to exhibit strict flight and crew discipline.

Area 11, Situational Awareness.

Q Maintained appropriate situational awareness throughout the mission. Was aware and correctly reacted to simulated or actual changes while in execution. Demonstrated utmost understanding of events in and around the mission.

Q- Minor lapses in situational awareness degraded accomplishment of a portion of the assigned mission. Misinterpreted events in and around the mission which may have negatively affected mission accomplishment.

U Major lack of situational awareness caused or would have caused failure of the assigned mission. Failed to recognize events in and around the mission that caused mission failure.

Table 3.2. Qualification/Mission.

Area 12, Aircraft Preflight/Aircraft Configuration.

Q Accomplished all aircraft preflights and ensured the aircraft was properly configured to accommodate loading. Familiar with various configurations as outlined in applicable regulations.

Q- Accomplished preflights with minor deviations or omissions which would not impair mission effectiveness. Difficulty configuring the aircraft, but did not impede loading of aircraft. Limited knowledge of various configurations as outlined in applicable regulations.

U Failed to complete aircraft preflights or accomplished preflights with deviations or omissions which would impair mission effectiveness. Failed to ensure proper aircraft configuration or caused loading delays.

Area 13, Load Planning/Inspection.

Q Accurately planned/validated a load of cargo and/or passengers within aircraft Center of Gravity (CG) limits. Inspected cargo for proper preparation and documentation.

Q- Difficulty planning/validating a load of cargo and/or passengers within CG limits. Difficulty inspecting cargo for proper preparation and documentation.

U Unable to plan/validate a load of cargo and/or passengers within CG limits. Failed to inspect cargo for proper preparation and documentation.

Area 14, On/Off Loading Procedures.

Q Correctly on/off loaded cargo in a safe and timely manner.

Q- Difficulty during on/off loading of cargo.

U Failed to correctly or safely on/off load cargo. Loading procedures caused undue delay.

Area 15, Engine Running On/Offload.

Q Followed or able to explain proper procedures for engine running on/off loading operations.

Q- Difficulty following or incorrect description of proper procedures for engine running on/off loading operations.

U Did not follow or unable to describe proper procedures for engine running on/off loading operations.

Area 16, Combat Offload.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of combat offload limitations/procedures.

Q- Demonstrated/explained adequate knowledge of combat offload limitations/procedures with minor deviations. Safety was not compromised.

U Failed to demonstrate/explain a thorough knowledge of combat offload limitations/procedures. Safety was compromised.

Area 17, Winching Procedures.

Q Correctly demonstrated and/or explained winching procedures.

Q- Difficulty demonstrating and/or did not completely explain correct winching procedures. Safety was not compromised.

U Failed to demonstrate and/or did not explain correct winching procedures. Safety was compromised.

Area 18, Tie Down/Restraint.

Q Correctly calculated and applied correct amount of restraint. Understood and could state the principles of restraint.

Q- Difficulty calculating and applying the correct amount of restraint. Did not fully understand the principles of restraint.

U Failed to correctly calculate and apply the correct amount of restraint. Did not understand and could not state the principles of restraint.

Area 19, Passenger Handling.

Q Correctly briefed and performed passenger handling procedures.

Q- Difficulty briefing and/or performing passenger handling procedures.

U Failed to brief and/or did not perform proper passenger handling procedures.

Area 20, Weight and Balance.

Q Completed DD Form 365-4 accurately with only minor mistakes. Errors in takeoff or landing gross weights did not exceed +/- 500 lbs. Percent of MAC was within +/- 0.5 percent. Did not exceed aircraft gross takeoff limits. Did not exceed any aircraft center of gravity limitations.

Q- Errors on DD Form 365-4 exceeded takeoff or landing gross weights by +/- 501 to 1,000 pounds or percent of MAC limitations by +/- 0.6 to 1.0 percent. Did not exceed aircraft gross takeoff limits. Did not exceed any aircraft center of gravity limitations.

U Failed to complete DD Form 365-4 accurately. Takeoff or landing gross weights were in excess of +/- 1,000 pounds or percent of MAC limitations exceeded +/- 1.0 percent. Exceeded aircraft gross takeoff weight/center of gravity limits.

Area 21, Cargo Compartment Limitations. As a minimum, evaluate Subareas 21A, Cargo Rails/Rollers; 21B, Floor Limitations; 21C, Charts & Graphs; 21D, Palletized Cargo; 21E, Rolling Stock; and 21F, Floor loaded Cargo.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of limitations associated with the aircraft, on/off loading, and associated equipment. Could apply aircraft limitations to actual loading situations.

Q- Demonstrated/explained adequate knowledge of limitations associated with the aircraft, on/off loading, and associated equipment with minor deviations. Safety was not compromised. Could apply aircraft limitations to actual loading situations.

U Failed to demonstrate/explain a thorough knowledge of limitations associated with the aircraft, on/off loading, and associated equipment. Safety was compromised. Had difficulty applying aircraft limitations to actual loading situations.

Area 22, Systems Knowledge/Operation. At a minimum, evaluate Subareas 22A, Oxygen; 22B, Ramp and Door; 22C, Landing Gear; 22D, Electric/External Power; 22E, Auxiliary Power Unit (APU); 22F, Hydraulics; and 22G, Environmental.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of aircraft systems operations/limitations and proper procedural use of systems.

Q- Marginal knowledge of aircraft systems operations and limitations in some areas. Slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective action. Did not negatively impact mission effectiveness.

U Unsatisfactory systems knowledge. Unable to analyze problems or apply proper corrective action. Could have impacted mission effectiveness.

Area 23, Hazardous Material.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of hazardous cargo procedures. Complied with the provisions of airlift directives and messages, AFMAN 24-604, *Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments*, and/or followed the procedures for air movement of hazardous cargo under channel, tactical, or contingency conditions.

Q- Demonstrated/explained adequate knowledge of hazardous cargo procedures with minor deviations. Safety was not compromised. Complied with the provisions of airlift directives and messages, AFMAN 24-604, and/or followed the procedures for air movement of hazardous cargo under channel, tactical, or contingency conditions.

U Did not understand hazardous cargo procedures in accordance with airlift directives and messages and/or AFMAN 24-604. Did not comply with the provisions of AFMAN 24-604, and/or follow the procedures for air movement of hazardous cargo under channel, tactical, or contingency conditions. Safety was compromised.

Area 24, Taxi Operations.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of taxi limitations/procedures.

Q- Demonstrated/explained adequate knowledge of taxi limitations/procedures with minor deviations. Safety was not compromised.

U Failed to demonstrate/explain a thorough knowledge of taxi limitations/procedures. Safety was compromised.

Area 25, Boldface Emergency Procedures (Critical). May be observed, verbalized or written.

Q Correct, immediate responses. Coordinated proper crew actions.

U Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory response, or unsatisfactory performance of corrective actions.

Area 26, Emergency Procedures.

Q Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems. Performed/explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction. Effectively used available aids.

Q- Operated within prescribed limits but slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions. Did not effectively use and/or experienced delays, omissions, or deviations in use of checklist and/or available aids.

U Exceeded limitations. Unable or failed to analyze problem or take proper corrective action. Did not use checklist and/or available aids.

Area 27, NVG Operations.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of NVG preflight, operations, limitations, and procedures.

Q- Exhibited minimal knowledge of NVG preflight, operations, limitations, and procedures. Lack of knowledge did not impact mission effectiveness.

U Failed to demonstrate/explain adequate knowledge of NVG preflight, operations, limitations, and procedures. Safety was compromised. Lack of knowledge impacted mission effectiveness.

Area 28, Aircraft Servicing Operations.

Q Displayed thorough knowledge of aircraft servicing procedures and equipment. Familiar with where to find information on performing authorized maintenance tasks. Demonstrated and/or explained the proper procedures.

Q- Minimal knowledge of the proper procedures to perform aircraft servicing operations and equipment. Had difficulty locating information on performing authorized maintenance tasks.

U Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of aircraft servicing procedures and equipment. Unable to find information on performing authorized maintenance tasks. Unable to properly perform aircraft servicing operations.

Table 3.3. Airdrop.

Area 29, Airdrop Preflight/Rigging Procedures. At a minimum, evaluate the following areas: personnel, heavy equipment, and CDS.

Q Accomplished aircraft airdrop preflights and ensured the aircraft was properly configured to accommodate oncoming load. Familiar with various airdrop configurations as outlined in applicable regulations. Correctly rigged and identified key airdrop components.

Q- Accomplished preflights with minor deviations or omissions which would not impair mission effectiveness. Difficulty configuring the aircraft, but did not impede loading of aircraft. Limited knowledge of various configurations as outlined in applicable directives. Difficulty rigging and/or identifying key airdrop components.

U Failed to complete aircraft preflights or accomplished preflights with deviations or omissions which would impair mission effectiveness. Failed to ensure proper aircraft configuration or caused loading delays. Failed to rig and/or identify key airdrop components.

Area 30, Airdrop Systems Knowledge/Operation. At a minimum, evaluate the following areas: personnel, heavy equipment, and CDS.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of airdrop systems operations/limitations and proper procedural use of systems.

Q- Marginal knowledge of airdrop systems operations/limitations in some areas. Slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective action. Would not have impacted mission effectiveness.

U Unsatisfactory systems knowledge. Unable to analyze problems or apply proper corrective action. Could have impacted mission effectiveness.

Area 31, Airdrop Emergency Procedures. At a minimum, evaluate the following areas: personnel, heavy equipment, and CDS.

Q Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems. Performed/explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction. Effectively used available aids.

Q- Operated within prescribed limits but slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions. Did not effectively use and/or experienced delays, omissions, or deviations in use of checklist and/or available aids.

U Exceeded limitations. Unable or failed to analyze problem or take proper corrective action. Did not use checklist and/or available aids.

Table 3.4. SOLL II.

Area 32, Knowledge of SO Procedures/SOPs.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of SO procedures and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Q- Marginal knowledge of SO procedures and SOPs. Slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective action. Would not have impacted mission effectiveness.

U Unsatisfactory knowledge of SO procedures and SOPs. Unable to analyze problems or apply proper corrective action. Could have impacted mission effectiveness.

Area 33, Briefings.

Q All required briefings accomplished in accordance with the briefing guides. Adequate information relayed to safely conduct operations.

Q- All required briefings accomplished in accordance with the briefing guides. Some pertinent information was missing from the briefings, but did not result in unsafe operations.

U Required briefings not accomplished or lacked pertinent information, which resulted, or may have resulted, in unsafe operations.

Area 34, NVG Operations.

Q Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems. Effectively used NVGs. Demonstrated/explained safe and effective communication procedures in the event of NVG failure.

Q- Operated within prescribed limits but slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions. Did not effectively use NVGs. Demonstrated/explained communication procedures in the event of NVG failure with omissions.

U Exceeded limitations. Unable or failed to analyze problem or take proper corrective action. Did not use NVGs effectively. Failed to demonstrate/explain safe and effective communication procedures in the event of NVG failure.

Area 35, Aircraft Preparations.

Q Accomplished all aircraft preparations and ensured the aircraft was properly configured to accommodate oncoming load.

Q- Accomplished aircraft preparations with minor deviations or omissions which would not impair mission effectiveness. Difficulty in preparing the aircraft, but did not impede loading of aircraft.

U Failed to complete aircraft preparation or accomplished with deviations or omissions which would impair mission effectiveness. Failed to ensure proper aircraft configuration or caused loading delays.

Area 36, On/Off Loading Procedures.

Q Correctly on/off loaded cargo using special operations procedures in a safe and timely manner.

Q- Difficulty on/off loading cargo using special operations procedures.

U Failed to correctly or safely on/off load cargo using special operations procedures. Loading procedures caused undue delay.

Area 37, Special Equipment.

Q Demonstrated/expained a thorough knowledge of special equipment operations/limitations.

Q- Marginal knowledge of special equipment operations and limitations. Slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective action. Would not have impacted mission effectiveness.

U Unsatisfactory knowledge of special equipment operations/limitations. Unable to analyze problems or apply proper corrective action. Could have impacted mission effectiveness.

Area 38, Emergency Procedures.

Q Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems. Performed/expained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction. Effectively used available aids.

Q- Operated within prescribed limits but slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions. Did not effectively use and/or experienced delays, omissions, or deviations in use of checklist and/or available aids.

U Exceeded limitations. Unable or failed to analyze problem or take proper corrective action. Did not use checklist and/or available aids.

Area 39, Forward Area Refueling Point (FARP).

Q Demonstrated/expained a thorough knowledge of FARP equipment operations, limitations and emergency procedures.

Q- Demonstrated/expained a marginal knowledge of special equipment operations, limitations or emergency procedures with omissions/deviations which would not have negatively impacted mission accomplishment.

U Unable to demonstrate/explain working knowledge of special equipment operations, limitations or emergency procedures. Failure to display safe and proper operation/acceptable knowledge of equipment, limitations, or emergency procedures would have had a negative impact on mission accomplishment.

Area 40, Special Operations Airdrop Procedures.

Q Demonstrated/explained a thorough knowledge of Special Operations Airdrop Rigging/Malfunction Procedures to include Heavy Equipment, CDS, Personnel, CEP, and Ramp Bundle operations and limitations.

Q- Demonstrated/explained a marginal knowledge of Special Operations Airdrop Rigging/Malfunction Procedures to include Heavy Equipment, CDS, Personnel, CEP, and Ramp Bundle operations and limitations.

U Unable to demonstrate/explain working knowledge of Special Operations Airdrop Rigging/Malfunction Procedures to include Heavy Equipment, CDS, Personnel, CEP, and Ramp Bundle operations and limitations.

Table 3.5. PNAF.

Area 41, General PNAF Procedures.

Q Correctly demonstrated general PNAF procedures (actual or simulated) to include mission planning, hot arrival/departure, weapon inspection, aircrew arming, post-mission duties and Command Disablement System (CDS) procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Q- With minor deviations/difficulty, adequately demonstrated general PNAF procedures (actual or simulated) to include mission planning, hot arrival/departure, weapon inspection, aircrew arming, post-mission duties, and CDS procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unsatisfactory demonstration of general PNAF procedures (actual or simulated) to include mission planning, hot arrival/departure, weapon inspection, aircrew arming, post-mission duties, and CDS procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Area 42, Two Person Concept (TPC) (Critical).

Q Satisfactorily demonstrated proper adherence and enforcement of the TPC (actual or simulated) in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unsatisfactorily demonstrated proper adherence and enforcement of the TPC (actual or simulated) in accordance with PNAF directives.

Area 43, Emergency/Contingency Procedures.

Q Satisfactorily explained or demonstrated PNAF related emergency/contingency procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Q- Difficulty explaining or demonstrating PNAF related emergency/contingency procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unable to explain or demonstrate PNAF related emergency or contingency procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Area 44, Operations Security (OPSEC) (Critical).

Q Satisfactorily demonstrated proper adherence to OPSEC procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

U Unsatisfactorily demonstrated proper adherence to OPSEC procedures in accordance with PNAF directives.

Area 45, T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 Loading and Offloading Procedures.

Q Satisfactorily demonstrated the ability to supervise loading and offloading procedures to include use of loading aids and restraints.

Q- Difficulty supervising and/or enforcing loading and/or offloading procedures. Difficulty using loading aids and/or applying restraint in accordance with appropriate directives. Minor deviations/omissions did not impact mission effectiveness. Safety was not compromised

U Failed to properly supervise and/or enforce loading and/or offloading procedures. Failed to properly use loading aids and/or apply restraint in accordance with appropriate directives. Mission effectiveness was or could have been impacted. Safety was or could have been compromised.

Table 3.6. Instructor.

Area 46, Instructor Ability (Critical).

Q Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided appropriate guidance when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected potentially unsafe operations/situations.

U Unable to effectively communicate or provide timely feedback to the student. Did not provide corrective action when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student problems. Did not identify unsafe operations/situations in a timely manner. Made no attempt to instruct.

Area 47, Technical Knowledge (Critical).

Q Effectively demonstrated procedures and techniques. Thorough knowledge of aircraft systems and applicable Aircrew e-Pubs publications/directives.

U Did not demonstrate correct procedure or techniques. Insufficient depth of knowledge about applicable aircraft systems, procedures, and/or proper source material.

Area 48, Student Briefing/Critique (Critical).

Q Briefings were well organized, accurate, and thorough. Reviewed student's present level of training and defined mission events to be performed. During the critique, demonstrated an effective ability to reconstruct the flight, offer mission analysis, and provide guidance where appropriate. Training grade reflected the actual performance of the student relative to the standard. Pre-briefed the student's next mission, if required.

| |
|---|
| U Briefings were marginal or non-existent. Did not review student's past performance. Failed to adequately critique student or analyze the mission. Training grade did not reflect actual performance of student. Overlooked or omitted major discrepancies. Incomplete pre-briefing of student's next mission, if required. |
|---|

3.9. Unit. Units will include MAJCOM-specific and local evaluation areas in **Chapter 4**. Include the evaluation areas on AF Form 3862 (see **paragraph 1.10**).

Chapter 4

LOCAL PROCEDURES

4.1. General. Use this chapter to define local evaluation criteria, as required.

JOSEPH T. GUASTELLA Jr., Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

AFI 11-202V2, *Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Program*, 6 December 2018

AFI 11-290, *Cockpit/Crew Resource Management Program*, 27 May 2020

AFI 13-527, *Nuclear Weapons Airlift Operations Training*, 24 July 2018

AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

AFMAN 11-202V1, *Aircrew Training*, 27 September 2019

AFMAN 11-202V3, *Flight Operations*, 10 June 2020

AFMAN 11-218, *Aircraft Operations and Movement on the Ground*, 5 April 2019

AFMAN 11-2C-17V1, *C-17 Aircrew Training*, 12 February 2020

AFMAN 11-2C-17V3, *C-17 Operations Procedures*, 30 July 2019

AFMAN 11-210, *Instrument Refresher Program (IRP)*, 4 October 2019

AFMAN 13-526, *Nuclear Airlift Operations*, 3 October 2018

AFMAN 24-604, *Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments*, 9 October 2020

AFTTP 3-1.C-17A, *Tactical Employment C-17A (U)*, 1 January 2021, (Secret)

DAFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, 1 December 2015

DAFMAN 13-217, *Drop Zone, Landing Zone, and Helicopter Landing Zone Operations*, 22 April 2021

T.O. 1C-17A-1-4, *Airdrop Mission Crew Manual*, 1 December 2020

T.O. 1C-17A-1-5, *Special Operations Crew Manual*, 1 December 2020

T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, *Loading and Air Transport of Nuclear Weapon Cargo (Nonpalletized)*, 20 July 2020

Adopted Forms

AF Form 8, *Certificate of Aircrew Qualification*

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF Form 942, *Record of Evaluation*

AF Form 3862, *Aircrew Evaluation Worksheet*

AMC Form 4031, *CRM/TEM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AC—Aircraft Commander

AFCS—Automated Flight Control System

AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFMAN—Air Force Manual
AFTTP—Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
A/R, AAR—Air Refueling
ALZ—Assault Landing Zone
ASR—Airport Surveillance Radar
ATC—Air Traffic Control
ATD—Aircraft Training Device
BAQ—Basic Aircraft Qualification
CARP—Computed Air Release Point
CBT—Computer Based Training
CDS—Container Delivery System
CDS—Command Disable System
CG—Center of Gravity
CRM—Crew Resource Management
EAL—Entry Authority List
EOC—End of Course
EPE—Emergency Procedures Evaluation
EPR—Engine Pressure Ratio
ERO—Engine Running On/Offload
FCIF—Flight Crew Information File
FCG—Foreign Clearance Guide
FEF—Flight Evaluation Folder
FFS—Formation Flight System
FP—First Pilot
FTL—Flying Training Level
FTU—Formal Training Unit
GPS—Global Positioning System
IAP—Instrument Approach Plate
ILS—Instrument Landing System
IRC—Instrument Refresher Course
KIAS—Knots Indicated Airspeed

LOC—Localizer
LS—Left Seat
MAP—Missed Approach Point
MC—Mission Computer
MDA—Minimum Descent Altitude
MLS—Microwave Landing System
MQF—Master Question File
NDB—Non-Directional Beacon
NM—Nautical Mile
NVG—Night Vision Goggles
OME—Operational Mission Evaluation
PAR—Precision Approach Radar
PCO—Pilot Check Out
PDA—Pilot Directed Airdrop
PF—Pilot Flying
PM—Pilot Monitoring
RQ—Requalification
PNAF—Prime Nuclear Airlift Force
RAIM—Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RNAV—Area Navigation
RON—Remain Over Night
SKE—Station Keeping Equipment
SOLL—Special Operations Low-Level
SO—Special Operations
SOP—Standard Operating Procedures
SVA—Sole Vouching Authority
SWOG—Special Weapons Overflight Guide
TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation System
TAZ—Tactical Avoidance Zone
TCS—Task, Conditions and Standards
TEM—Threat Error Management
T.O.—Technical Order

TOA—Time Of Arrival

TOT—Time Over Target

TPC—Two Person Concept

VDP—Visual Descent Point

VVM—Verbalize, Verify, Monitor

VOR—VHF Omni Directional Radio Range

WST—Weapons System Trainer

Terms

Areas/Subareas—Specific grading items which can be evaluated on an evaluation

Tolerances—Range of acceptable deviation from the standard.